Karen Armstrong’s Theology

When honestly facing internal inconsistencies in mysticisms like Christianity, its spinmeisters i.e. theologians like Karen Armstrong resort to ridiculous ideas. On Fresh Air a few weeks ago she said,

1. God is no being at all.

compare the above with this statement

2. No being at all is God.

Number 1 is sophisticated theology. Number 2 is crude atheism. Yet both are logically equivalent. If you put them in to predicate calculus they are the same.

At this point I am beginning to what I call the transparency of theology. It is like a magicians card trick where you can see the cards up his sleeve. Fortunately Richard Dawkins has already answered Karen Armstrong. He wrote:

If sophisticated theologians or postmodern relativists think they are rescuing God from the redundancy scrap-heap by downplaying the importance of existence they should think again. Tell the congregation of a church or mosque that existence is too vulgar an attribute to fasten onto their God, and they will brand you an atheist. They’ll be right.

Is Christian Morality Objective? Part II: The Lessons of Jesus: Imperatives Without Reason

The gospel accounts of Jesus’ life and ministry detail the moral teachings of Christianity’s primary figurehead. These teachings can be found throughout the gospel stories in Jesus’ sermons, prayers and parables, which are attempts to illustrate certain principles by situational example.

One of the most consistent yet glaring disappointments found in biblical morality, including the teachings of Jesus, is the fact that its precepts are asserted without reason. Just as the Ten Commandments (Exodus 20; Deuteronomy 5) are asserted without any appeal to reason (e.g., we are not told why one should not steal; we are just told not to), Jesus offers the vast majority of his moral teachings without supporting arguments (i.e., without an appeal to reason) and without reference to any reality-based needs of man they are intended to satisfy. This fact alone disqualifies them from being categorized as part of an objective moral theory, since the development of an objective theory of morality cannot neglect the vital role which reason plays in the foundation of morality and the tie of moral principle to reality. Nor can it ignore the fact that morality and moral principles are not self-sufficient, irreducible primaries which are true “just because” someone says so; moral principles are dependent on prior philosophical foundations (e.g., metaphysics and epistemology), as recognized by Objectivism. [1]

Many religious apologists have attempted to provide reasons for biblical teachings where the Bible itself provides none. Thus today, outside the Bible, we find the assertion of biblical moral teachings as buttressed by theological interpolation which enjoys the benefit of modern philosophical developments. These interpolations are often fortified by groping conjecture about what the authors of those moral teachings may have had in mind when they were first formulated and recorded. The occasion of such extra-biblical interpolation and conjecture, however, does not overturn the fact that the surviving ancient writings pertaining to Jesus and other biblical characters failed to offer any reasoning for many of their moral teachings. Indeed, many of those extra-biblical attempts to invigorate biblical moral teachings with injections of rationalizing supports simply beg important questions. [2]

For instance, one of the primary themes which Christian apologists may emphasize in their defenses of Judeo-Christian morality is the supposedly unchanging character of its foundation: the Judeo- Christian God. An unchanging moral code is one thought to be absolute, apparently regardless of that code’s particular virtues or failings, and therefore superior to the fluctuating and “situationalistic” attitudes often encountered in secular doctrines, which are summarily labeled as “conventional” or “relativistic.” As apologist Erwin Lutzer argues, “If God’s moral revelation is rooted in His nature, it is clear that those moral principles will transcend time. Although specific commands may change from one era to another, the principles remain constant.” [3]

Certainly, the reservation that “specific commands may change from one era to another” is offered to cover the fact that many of the moral teachings found in the New Testament actually represent a dissembling of the Hebraic teachings found in the Old Testament. [4] By reference to those principles which “remain constant,” however, Lutzer no doubt means the one primary principle which underlies all biblical moral teaching, which is: God’s demands are inviolable, and man must do whatever God says, or suffer for eternity. And this “principle” – essentially a threat against man’s right to exist for his own life, a threat against man for using his own independent reason – is the guiding precept of all Christian morality, which will always “remain constant.” The supposed validity of such a principle is simply taken for granted.

That religious ethics proceeds on the basis of threat is undeniable. The question “Why should I obey God?” will ultimately yield the answer “Because if you do not, you will go to hell.” [5] But this tactic makes certain general assumptions about man’s character which are untenable.

For instance, if man must be threatened in order to conduct himself morally, what does this say about his nature? It likely assumes that man will not conduct himself morally out of his own self- interest – which suggests that the moral is inherently against his self-interest, or at least that morality and self-interest are inherently opposed to or incompatible with one another, even though many Christians claim that following “God’s moral plan for man” is in man’s best interest. Of course, the “interest” in their mind is not in terms of living life on earth, but in terms of what supposedly lies beyond the grave after one’s death. This of course only begs the question: If it were the case that Judeo-Christian moral teaching is in man’s best interest, then why would there be any need for the Bible’s threat of eternal torment for “disobedience”? Blank out.

The hint of truth that makes this approach to morality so appealing to religious persons is the fact that man requires a standard to guide his choices and actions, and that his actions have certain consequences. But rather than providing a moral code which motivates one’s choices and actions by the legitimate rewards he can rationally earn and enjoy during his life, Christian morality instead reverses this motivation, and compels men to act out of fear of certain punishment. This is not a values-based form of morality, but a sanction-based form of morality.

By sanction I mean “a physical or psychological means of coercion or intimidation used for the purpose of motivating obedience to a principle of action.” [6] The question here is one of motivation: what determines or guides one’s actions? On a sanction-based form of morality, one’s actions are determined by threats of punishment for failure to perform the expected action. On a values-based form of morality, one’s actions are determined by one’s choice to live and to identify and acquire those values which his life requires. On a sanction-based form of morality, the goal is compliance with someone’s demands, while on a values-based form of morality the goal is the enjoyment of life. These distinctions are not merely a matter of perspective; it is not a mere question of whether the glass is half full or half empty as if one approach were somehow complementary to the other. Rather, the sanction-based approach constitutes a thorough and systematic process of undermining man’s ability – to the point of psycho-cognitive paralysis – to value his own life for its own sake and to govern his choices and actions according to the objective standard of his life’s requirements.

This approach to morality – that man must be threatened into conducting himself morally – completely ignores man’s nature as a being of volitional rationality. Indeed, such a view of morality cannot proceed from the recognition that man is capable of rationality; a sanction-based form of morality is endorsed in spite of man’s potential rationality, i.e., to thwart his rationality and replace it with a mystical code of divine whims. A code of morality which is based on man’s rational nature stresses the importance of values to his life: if a goal is in man’s own best interest, then it is the value of that goal to his life – not the fear of threats – which will motivate him to that action which enables him to achieve that goal. But a mystic code is to be followed regardless of its consequences in the individual’s life. What Rand said of the New Left applies equally to the religious: “They are not pulled by a goal, but pushed by the panic of mindless terror.” [7] This should be of no surprise when we consider the fact that the Bible that “fear is the beginning of knowledge” (Prov. 1:7).

The life-based nature of man’s rational values is ignored when apologists such as Lutzer claim that “God’s moral revelation was given for our benefit.” When attempting to support this claim, Lutzer argues

Though in the short run it may sometimes appear that biblical moral standards are too restrictive, we can be sure that such injunctions are for our benefit because of His love for us. After all, in the long run God knows best since because of His omniscience, He can calculate all the consequences. [8]

 

Here, Lutzer’s argument merely repeats the conclusion he attempts to secure, and nowhere does he show how “biblical moral standards” are beneficial to man. Moreover, we already know that the idea that an immortal God can love man or anything else is incoherent. [9] So this assumption cannot be used as a premise in an argument which is said to be sound.

By acknowledging that “in the short run it may sometimes appear that biblical moral standards are too restrictive,” Lutzer is actually referring to the fact that biblical morality is completely opposed to man’s self-interest (i.e., the virtue of selfishness) and his guilt-free enjoyment of his own life (i.e., his happiness). Religious leaders throughout history have always come down against man’s enjoyment of his own life, and that is at least on of the reasons why “it may sometimes appear that biblical moral standards are too restrictive.” [10]

This is nowhere so apparent as in the Bible’s attitudes against man’s capacity for sexual enjoyment. According to Jesus, for instance, it is morally wrong for a man even to gaze at the beauty of an attractive woman (qv. Matt. 5:28). Paul goes so far as to say that men who are single should “seek not a wife” (I Cor. 7:27), though he gives no reason, not even a bad reason, why they should practice what he preaches. And for those men who are married, Paul says that “he that standeth stedfast [sic] in his heart, having no necessity, but hath power over his own will, and hath so decreed in his heart that he will keep his virgin [i.e., refrain from sexual intercourse], doeth well.” (I Cor. 7:37). [11] Again, regardless of interpretation, Paul does not say why, but effectually leaves any “reasoning” for his arbitrary injunctions to later theological interpolation. [12]

Another problem with this approach to morality is closely related to the one already discussed. For if man must obey commandments in order to be moral, then obviously this means that man cannot discover a moral code through his use of reason, because he needs to be told what to do rather than figure it out (i.e., discover and identify his life’s needs by means of reason) for himself. [13] This of course makes man completely dependent on those issuing the commandments, which are the priests and mystics. [14] This naturally elevates dependence as such to the status of a moral virtue, which of course is an egregious affront to man’s life.

This is the call for man to surrender his mind (i.e., his ability to reason), which is his chief value to begin with. For if he surrenders his mind, how can he determine that his life requires values and that he needs to identify and pursue those values, that he’s been duped by mystical indoctrination [15], or that his rights have been violated? Man needs an intact mind in order to determine these things, but if the code of morality to which he subscribes compels him to surrender his mind, then naturally he surrenders his ability to make these determinations. Clearly, blind obedience to arbitrary commandments cannot substitute for reason and objective values. Commands are appropriate for machines (e.g., computers) and dogs, not for men. However, it is no mere coincidence that commands are preferred by those who intend to rule others.

So far, we can see that the denial of man’s rational nature [16], can only lead to a code of “morality” which works against his mind, and therefore against his values. The Bible nowhere defines the concept ‘value’, nor does it acknowledge the crucial role which values play in man’s moral choices and actions. Instead of value, which is profoundly selfish in nature (of value to whom?) [17], the Judeo-Christian view of morality relies on unreasoned commandments, commandments which do not take into account man’s genuine moral needs, nor his rational purpose, which is to live and to enjoy his life. Indeed, because biblical teaching nowhere defines morality systematically, nor does it explain why man should be moral (other than to flee arbitrary threats), its teachings can only amount to a moral code opposed to his existence. According to such a view taken seriously, life is nothing more than a nightmare existence spent on the run from the wrath of the all-seeing ruling consciousness. Fittingly, the only time values are mentioned in illustration of moral principle, is when believers are expected to sacrifice them. [18]

Consequently, as I have argued before, there are many problems with the claim that Judeo-Christian morality is objective in nature. Many (in fact, the vast majority) of the Bible’s moral teachings are offered as self-sufficient primaries, without rational support, without concern for integrating them into the sum of one’s knowledge without contradiction, without reference to an objective theory of values, without relating morality to man’s nature and need for morality. My analysis of Jesus’ teachings which shall follow in future essays will demonstrate not only that Jesus gives no argument for the teachings which his believers try to pass off as moral, but also that those teachings are incongruent with man’s objective moral needs.

Footnotes

[1] See particularly Ayn Rand’s “This is John Galt Speaking,” For the New Intellectual, pp. 117-192; “The Objectivist Ethics,” The Virtue of Selfishness, pp. 13-35; and “The Good” in Dr. Leonard Peikoff’s Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand, pp. 206-249.
[2] Additionally, there are no doubt many sects within the fundamentalist movement today which view extra-biblical sources with suspicion. Consequently, they do not accept many of the reasons which some theologians and apologists provide in support of biblical teachings, and may even consider such attempts to be tampering infringement of otherwise divinely authoritative law. This only underscores the fact that there is no unity or unanimity among the many often rivalrous denominations of Christian theism.

[3] Measuring Morality: A Comparison of Ethical Systems.

[4] One source puts it quite explicitly:

Throughout the Church Age, there have been many religious institutions and groups that have advocated the keeping of certain Old Testament laws. The two most popular O.T. laws today are tithing and sabbath keeping. Some groups take the concept so far as to wear fringes on their underwear! We realize that there is nothing wrong with someone setting aside money or time to the Lord, but there is something wrong with using Old Testament laws as the basis for doing so. Christians are to rely on the Holy Spirit for our direction and not the Mosaic Law. (The Old Covenant Compared to the New Covenant, emphasis added.)

 

Most Christians in the so-called “mainstream” of western society do not, for instance, advocate that practitioners of witchcraft be executed for their “iniquity,” even though Exodus 22:18 states “Thou shalt not suffer a witch to live.” Some Christians, however, such as those who identify themselves as “Reconstructionists,” do advocate a full embrace of the Mosaic laws as provided in the Old Testament and, in the words of Walter Olson, “reckon only a relative few dietary and ritualistic observances were overthrown” by the New Testament reforms. (An Invitation to A Stoning: Getting Cozy with Theocrats, Reason Magazine, Nov. 1998.)

[5] Many apologists are likely to take exception at my characterization of this tactic as a threat. Indeed, they will affirm that this is the operative tactic underlying Christian teachings, but instead prefer to call it a “warning.” This blatant equivocation fails, see: An Aborted Rise to Challenge.

[6] George H. Smith, Atheism: The Case Against God, (Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books, 1989), p. 298.
[7] Ayn Rand, “From a Symposium,” The New Left: The Anti-Industrial Revolution, (New York: Signet, 1971), p. 98.
[8] Measuring Morality: A Comparison of Ethical Systems.
[9] I make this argument in my essay Why an Immortal God Cannot Value.

[10] It should be noted that, by “man’s enjoyment of his own life,” I am not referring to simple, fleeting pleasures, but to the Objectivist conception of happiness as an end in itself. “Happiness is the successful state of life… [a] state of consciousness which proceeds from the achievement of one’s values.” (Atlas Shrugged, p. 932.)

Happiness is a state of non-contradictory joy – a joy without penalty or guilt, a joy that does not clash with any of your values and does not work for your own destruction, not the joy of escaping from your mind, but of using your mind’s fullest power, not the joy of faking reality, but of achieving values that are real, not the joy of a drunkard, but of a producer. (Ibid., p. 939.)

 

The connection man’s need for morality and his achievement of happiness as a goal in itself is the concept of moral value. This kind of joy is therefore not possible on a sanction-based form of morality which hinges on one’s fears rather than his values.

[11] This teaching of Paul’s seems in principle to conflict with Jesus’ teaching in Matt. 5:32, which states: “whosoever shall put away his wife, saving for the cause of fornication, causeth her to commit adultery.” If Paul thinks it’s good for a man to remain married, yet decree “in his heart that he will keep his virgin,” does that not also drive his wife to “commit adultery” as Jesus cautioned? Indeed, if she wanted to enjoy her life (and I know of no pleasure in life greater than sexual enjoyment), she would surely have to seek out that enjoyment in a partner outside her marriage. Paul would have done well to have restrained himself from writing on these matters until after the Gospel according to Matthew was written, edited, re-edited and published in its final form.

[12] In an effort to supply reason where none was originally provided, some commentators have argued that Paul’s injunctions against marriage acts were reasonable because Paul was expecting Jesus to return at any moment. Hence, the time was short and serious believers, intent on fulfilling Jesus’ “Great Commission” to preach the gospel to the world, had more important things to do with their dwindling time on earth than enjoying the earthly pleasures of marriage. Needless to say, Paul’s expectations seem to have been disappointed.

[13] What facts in reality, for instance, tell us that is it wrong to “seethe a kid in his mother’s milk” (Deut. 14:21)? What facts in reality tell us that a man whose testicles have been damaged or “his privy member cut off” should not be allowed to “enter into the congregation of the Lord” (Deut. 23:1)? What facts in reality tell us that, in an attempt “to deliver her husband out of the hand of him that smiteth him, and putteth forth her hand, and taketh him by the secrets [i.e., his genitals],” that her hand should be cut off and no one should pity here (Deut. 25:11-12)? (See other examples in Donald Morgan’s list of the Biblical Precepts: Questionable Guidelines.) Obviously, the facts of reality do not tell us these things. Rather, in many of these cases, it appears that someone’s jealousy tells us these things, and men are expected to obey them in order to appease the jealous.

[14] Arguments claiming that we learn these commandments from God directly beg the question, for still we must listen to the claims of men if we are to grant the notion that a God exists any validity at all and in order to determine which God is the “real” God, and which are the false gods. Besides, if we could learn of “God’s will” by some direct, revelatory means (as Paul apparently learned about Jesus – cf. Gal. 1:11-12), then why is it so important that believers “study to show [themselves] approved unto God… rightly dividing the word of truth” (II Tim. 2:15)? The whole point of religious morality is that morality is supernatural in nature – and therefore its transmission to men must occur ultimately by means of revelation and man’s “knowledge” of this revelation must come ultimately by faith. A morality which is natural (i.e., based on man’s nature as a living organism and its moral implications) is one which man can discover by means of reason. Faith in revelations need not apply. It is no surprise, then, that religious apologists hold that their oughts cannot be derived from what is, since their morality is wholly arbitrary, i.e., without basis in the facts of reality.

[15] Even mystics who fear losing believers to competing “false Christs” must be concerned about this potential problem.

[16] For the Bible nowhere defines man in the Aristotelian sense as the “rational animal,” nor does it treat him as such, and nor are its doctrines compatible with the rational view of man.

[17] I am assuming the Objectivist view of the concept ‘value’, which is “that which one acts to gain and/or keep” (Ayn Rand, “The Objectivist Ethics,” The Virtue of Selfishness, p. 15). See also the short article on Values at Importance of Philosophy.com and my essay Is Christian Morality Objective?

[18] For instance, in Mark 10:17-22, a young wealthy man approaches Jesus asking “what shall I do that I may inherit eternal life?” When the wealthy man tells Jesus that he has followed the commandments which Jesus prescribes from his youth, Jesus then says that he must sell all his belongings and give the proceeds to the poor. The episode is followed by Jesus’ condemnation of values in verses 23-25, saying “How hardly shall they that have riches enter into the kingdom of God!” Wealth enables men to achieve independence from others, and Jesus apparently perceived such independence as a threat to his mind-negating devotional scheme.

Is Christian Morality Objective? Part I: Introductory Treatise on Morality

Christian apologists since the Enlightenment have inflated their inventories of unusual and untenable claims about their religious ideals in order to protect them from critical scrutiny. One of the most recklessly untenable claims which finds its supporters among a broad spectrum of modern Christian apologetics, is the claim that Christian morality in particular is objective and that no moral system which denies the existence or sovereignty of Christian theism can be objective. As one who has a deep familiarity with the Christian moral code and the moral code of the philosophy of Objectivism which rejects all mysticism (including Christian theism), I wonder how today’s apologists can defend the view that Christian morality is objective when its foundations as given particularly in the New Testament run contrary to objective morality. In this series I will examine the code of Christian morality as given in the New Testament by the religion’s founders and submit its principles to the question of whether or not they can be said to be objective or not. Before doing so, it is important to clarify those working definitions which will be assumed in my assessment of Christian moral principles. In this paper, the first installment in my indictment of the Christian morality, I will clarify what I mean by objective morality from the standpoint of Rational Philosophy, which is Objectivism. This clarification is by no means offered as a complete explication on the objective moral system, but rather only an introduction to some of the chief issues concerned, as well as to the contrast between the Christian morality and the objective morality.

What is Morality, and Does Man Need It?

By ethics or morality (used interchangeably in this essay), I mean: “A code of values to guide man’s choices and actions, the choices and actions which determine the purpose and the course of his life.” [1] Thus morality is concerned with the choices which man the individual makes, and the actions he takes in regard to himself. Morality is therefore a private matter concerned with the individual’s personal affairs in distinction to the branch of philosophy known as politics, which is the application of moral principles to interpersonal relationships.
Morality deals with general questions such as: What should I value, and why? What goals should I pursue in life, and why? From these, more specific questions are generated: Should I develop my mind and productive ability, and if so, why? Should I pursue an education, and why? Should I get a job and seek gainful employment, and why? Should I save my income or squander it with abandon? Etc. It is only after many of these questions, primarily those general questions about morality, have been answered that an objective treatment of politics can be engaged. [2]

Since morality is “a code of values which guides man’s choices and actions,” an objective theory of morality must take into account general aspects of man’s identity in order to define and shape that code of values. Since man is a being of volitional rationality, Objectivism holds that man’s uncoerced volition is of central importance to an objective theory of morality. “A code of values accepted by choice is a code of morality.” [3] The moral is the chosen, not the coerced, just as the moral is the understood, not the obeyed. Thus, an objective code of morality naturally dispenses with the use of any species of threats, either in the form of physical coercion or psychological sanction.

What is Objectivity, and How Does It Relate to Morality?

To be objective is to “adhere [volitionally] to reality by following certain rules of method, a method based on facts and appropriate to man’s form of cognition” [4]. Reality is the realm of existence, and man’s means of discovering it is his sense-perception, and his means of identifying and integrating what he perceives is reason. Defining an objective code of morality requires that certain relevant facts (i.e., data of reality) be objectively identified and integrated. Thus, an objective moral code is a rational moral code whose reference is the facts of reality and whose purpose is to serve man (as opposed to religion, which treats morality as something which man must serve or “live up to”).

Man requires morality, not because somebody (either a priest or a deity) says he needs it, but because he faces a fundamental alternative: existence or non-existence. Since man continually faces the possibility of his own death, his life requires that he act, and this means he needs values. Why should he act? Because he will die if he does not. What guides his choices and actions? A code of values, i.e., morality. This implies necessarily that man’s highest value is his own life, because it is ultimately his own life which provides the standard of his actions and for which he must act. In light of this, we recognize that objective morality is profoundly selfish in nature, since man’s own life (i.e., his self) is the primary beneficiary of his own actions.

Three Primary Theories of the Good

The objective theory of the good, according to Ayn Rand, is:

The… theory [that] holds that the good is neither an attribute of ‘things in themselves’ nor of man’s emotional states, but an evaluation of the facts of reality by man’s consciousness according to a rational standard of value… The objective theory holds that the good is an aspect of reality in relation to man – and that it must be discovered, not invented, by man” [5].

Thus, the objective theory of the good, since it stems from “an evaluation from the facts of reality,” is rooted in the law of identity. The objective theory of the good, like knowledge, is also hierarchical in nature, since the evaluation of the facts of reality proceeds “according to a rational standard of value.” The objective theory of the good identifies that standard – man’s life – and therefore “that the good is an aspect of reality in relation to man.” It is because of this standard and the relation of aspects of reality that we can identify that food is good for man because it is his source of nutrition, and poison is bad for him because it can kill him. The fact that food is good for man and poison is not good is not something which men invent, but discover about reality. Throughout all its application, the objective theory of the good is completely consistent to the fact that existence exists and that to exist is to have a specific identity (i.e., the law of identity).

The objective theory of the good is generally contrasted against two competing theories, which Objectivism holds to be invalid and therefore unsuitable for man. Those theories are the intrinsic and the subjective theories of the good.

The intrinsic theory of the good, is: “The… theory [that] holds that the good is inherent in certain things or actions as such, regardless of their context and consequences, regardless of any benefit or injury they may cause to the actors or subjects involved.” [6] Thus, whether or not something is good for man according to the objective theory of the good, according to the intrinsic theory of the good something is good “just because” – either because one says it is regardless of its objective relation to man, or because one thinks God says it is good, regardless of its relation to man. Food can be bad for man (such as when he is commanded to fast), and poison can actually be permissible (such as when Jesus says his followers can ingest it and suffer no harm; cf. Mark 16:18). It is obvious that such a view of the good can only be valid on the assumption, implicit or explicit, of the primacy of consciousness view of metaphysics (i.e., of reality), since it is not the facts of reality which are important to make the evaluation that something is good, but the decrees of the ruling consciousness taken as solemnly unquestionable.
The subjectivist theory of the good, is: “The… theory [that] holds that the good bears no relation to the facts of reality, that it is the product of a man’s consciousness, created by his feelings, desires, ‘intuitions,’ or whims, and that it is merely an ‘arbitrary postulate’ or an ‘emotional commitment’.” [7] This view is similar to the intrinsic theory of the good in that what is said to be good ultimately has nothing to do with the facts of reality, but is dependent on the creative functions of consciousness. But where the intrinsic theory of the good might justify its idea of the good on the commandments and decrees of a cosmic form of consciousness, the subjective theory affirms that something is good based on personal whim. Thus, food can be good for man on Tuesdays, but poison can be good on Wednesdays. It differs in respect to the intrinsic theory in that the intrinsic theory at least attempts to affirm an unchanging standard, even if that standard is not complicit with the facts of reality. The subjective theory, by contrast, dispenses with any standard other than that whim is in charge and capable of rewriting its own evaluations whenever it feels like it.

The contrast between these various theories should be apparent. Only one of these theories, the objective theory, indicates the crucial role of an objective standard of value in the determination of what is good or morally proper to man. The intrinsic theory, which includes religious forms of morality [8], does not identify the crucial role of values in man’s life, and indeed cannot, for it is not the achievement of values that motivates moral behavior according to this view. Instead, one is told that certain actions or things are good “just because,” and compliance with intrinsic moral principles is to be motivated as if those principles were irreducible primaries, not rationally supported guidelines. The subjective theory of values is more or less a catchall to include those systems which neither identify the crucial role of values in man’s life, nor hold that things or actions are “good in themselves” as such, regardless of their benefit or injury to oneself or to others.

The objective theory of the good defines ‘value’ as “that which one acts to gain and keep,” and ‘virtue’ as “the action by which one gains and keeps it.” [9] Rand argues that the “concept ‘value’ is not a primary; it presupposes an answer to the question: of value to whom and for what? It presupposes an entity capable of acting to achieve a goal in the face of an alternative. Where no alternative exists, no goals and no values are possible.” [10]

The Core Principles of Objective Morality

The objective theory of the good finds its basis in the objective view of reality and the epistemology of reason. The objective view of reality is the view that existence exists independent of consciousness. Consistent with this view is the recognition that man must discover the facts of reality by looking outward, i.e., beyond himself. This means: man must rely on his senses as his first means of contact with the facts of reality. Thus, reason is “the faculty which identifies and integrates the material provided by man’s senses.” [11] The cognitive method or means by which reason enables man to identify and integrate what his senses tell him about reality is logic, which is the “art of non- contradictory identification. [12]

The view that man has the capacity to identify reality naturally presupposes that man is capable of the certainty that his consciousness is valid and that it has a vital purpose: to enable him to live. These facts must be made explicitly clear in the development of an objective view of morality, as Rand pointed out:

Man has no automatic code of survival. His particular distinction from all other living species is the necessity to act in the face of alternatives by means of volitional choice. He has no automatic knowledge of what is good for him or evil, what values his life depends on, what course of action it requires. [13]

In other words, man must discover from his activity in reality those actions and choices which make his life possible. “A being who does not know automatically what is true or false, cannot know automatically what is right or wrong, what is good for him or evil. Yet he needs this knowledge in order to live.” [14] While the intrinsic theory of he good holds that men can acquire this knowledge through some mystical means (e.g., “divine revelation”), and the subjective theory of the good holds that men can arbitrarily make up this knowledge as he goes, the objective theory of the good recognizes that man has a specific nature and that only a specific course of actions – a course which he cannot evade or alter by his own whim or by praying that some ruling consciousness can alter – can make living his life possible.

The objective view of man recognizes that he is an integrated being: man is both matter and consciousness welded into one unit. This means that the idea that the dichotomizing of standards for man’s body against those of his mind is invalid, just as the soul-body dichotomy is invalid. Therefore, this dichotomy is rejected in the development of the objective theory of the good with the recognition that man’s existential needs are just as valid as his philosophical and psychological needs, for the same reason and for the same purpose. The soul-body dichotomy is only compatible with a view of the good which dispenses with the objective view of man.

They have taught man that he is a hopeless misfit made of two elements, both symbols of death. A body without a soul is a corpse, a soul without a body is a ghost – yet such is their image of man’s nature: the battleground of a struggle between a corpse and a ghost, a corpse endowed with some evil volition of its own and a ghost endowed with the knowledge that everything known to man is non-existent, that only the unknowable exists. [15]

Certainly, this view of man cannot be compatible with the objective view of reality and the epistemology of reason as pointed out above. Consequently, it also cannot be integrated with the objective theory of the good, for the same reasons. The objective theory of the good is for man, not against him. Any philosophical theory which poses as being for man but is revealed upon examination to be against him, is a fraud in pious dressing.

Man, as an integrated being, requires a morality which is geared specifically to his nature, to his needs as a rational being. This is precisely what the Objectivist ethics, as discovered and identified by Ayn Rand, provides for man. The facts of man’s nature – that he continually faces the alternative of life vs. death, that he requires food, shelter, warmth, a rational means of knowledge – underscore man’s unalterable need for values. As she eloquently points out,

since the work of man’s mind is not automatic, his values, like all his premises, are the product either of his thinking or of his evasions: man chooses his values by a conscious process of thought – or accepts them by default, by subconscious associations, on faith, on someone’s authority, by some form of social osmosis or blind imitation. [16]

Man’s primary value is: his own life. Without it, he cannot value anything, and should he exist while pretending that some other object can replace that distinctive value (e.g., “God” or “society”), he undermines his ability to live to the degree that he is consistent to that pretense. Such a view simply ignores the fact that it is the nature of his being as such which dictates what he must value in order to make living his life possible.

The cardinal values of the objective theory of the good are: reason, purpose and self-esteem. “Reason as his only tool of knowledge – Purpose, as his choice of the happiness which that tool must proceed to achieve – Self-esteem, as his inviolate certainty that his mind is competent to think and his person is worthy of happiness, which means: is worthy of living.” [17] Their corresponding virtues are: rationality, productiveness and pride.

Rationality is the recognition of the fact that existence exists, that nothing can alter the truth and nothing can take precedence over the act of perceiving it, which is thinking – that the mind is one’s only judge of values and one’s only guide of action – that reason is an absolute that permits no compromise – that a concession to the irrational invalidates one’s consciousness and turns it from the task of perceiving to the task of faking reality – that the alleged short-cut to knowledge, which is faith, is only a short-circuit destroying the mind – that the acceptance of a mystical invention is a wish for the annihilation of existence and, properly, annihilates one’s consciousness. [18]

Morality is thus the application of man’s reason to the problem of his existence. As his only guide to action, reason as a value and rationality as its corresponding virtue enable man to use his mind in solving real problems – whether it be determining which things in a jungle are edible and safe for human consumption, or choosing a profession – as opposed to false or arbitrary problems, such as those which occupy theology students. [19] The application of rationality to legitimate problems which man faces in living his life is the subject of productive work.

Productiveness is your acceptance of morality, your recognition of the fact that you choose to live – that productive work is the process by which man’s consciousness controls his existence, a constant process of acquiring knowledge and shaping matter to fit one’s purpose, of translating an idea into physical form, of remaking the earth in the image of one’s values – that all work is creative work if done by a thinking mind, and no work is creative if done by a blank who repeats in uncritical stupor a routine he has learned from others – that your work is yours to choose, and the choice is as wide as your mind, that nothing more is possible to you and nothing less is human – that to cheat your way into a job bigger than your mind can handle is to become a fear-corroded ape on borrowed motions and borrowed time, and to settle down into a job that requires less than your mind’s full capacity is to cut your motor and sentence yourself to another kind of motion: decay – that your work is the process of achieving your value, and to lose your ambition for values is to lose your ambition to live. [20]

The result of productive work are the values which one produces. Since values are not readily available to man in nature for man simply to consume, man has no choice about the fact that the achievement of values requires his productive effort. But this effort is not possible without at least some estimation of one’s own worthiness of it. And this brings us to the cardinal virtue of pride.

Pride is the recognition of the fact that you are your own highest value and, like all of man’s values, it has to be earned – that of any achievements open to you, the one that makes all others possible is the creation of your own character – that your character, your actions, your desires, your emotions are the products of the premises held by your mind – that as man must produce the physical values he needs to sustain his life, so much he acquire the values of character that make his life worth sustaining – that as man is a being of self-made wealth, so he is a being of self-made soul – that to live requires a sense of self-value, but man, who has no automatic values, has no automatic sense of self-esteem and must earn it by shaping his soul in the image of his moral ideal, in the image of Man, the rational being he is born able to create [in himself - AT], but must create by choice – that the first precondition of self-esteem is that radiant selfishness of soul which desires the best in all things, in values of matter and spirit, a soul that seeks above all else to achieve its own moral perfection, valuing nothing higher than itself, and that the proof of an achieved self-esteem is your soul’s shudder of contempt against the role of a sacrificial animal, against the vile impertinence of any creed that proposes to immolate the irreplaceable value which is your consciousness and the incomparable glory which is your existence to the blind evasions and the stagnant decay of others. [21]

Together, rationality, productiveness and pride make man’s life qua man a vital possibility. But without these, man has no means of ensuring his primary value, which is his own life. With these core values, against the backdrop of a free society (i.e., a society in which coercion and the initiation of force are banned from interpersonal relationships), one has the basic equipment to lead a moral life.

The political corollary to the objective theory of the good is the recognition of man’s right to exist for his own sake. Just as man requires the freedom to use his mind, he requires the freedom to act, to pursue his values, and to achieve his happiness. A society which is built on the premise that man has a duty to sacrifice himself to others is a society which condemns men to lifelong slavery. In order to guard against such unspeakable injustice, man requires a society of individual rights.

A ‘right’ is a moral principle defining and sanctioning a man’s freedom in a social context. There is only one fundamental right (all the others are its consequences or corollaries): a man’s right to his own life. Life is a process of self-sustaining and self-generated action; the right to life means the right to engage in self-sustaining and self-generated action – which means: the freedom to take all the actions required by the nature of a rational being for the support, the furtherance, the fulfillment and the enjoyment of his own life. (Such is the meaning of the right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.) [22]

As defined here, a political doctrine defending man’s rights defends man’s rational self-interest in social contexts. This means that an individual’s activity with others is engaged by choice, not by psychological coercion or the use of force. It is only the recognition of the principle that man has the right to exist for his own sake which will protect men against coercion and force, and which will allow an individual to pursue those values which make his life worth living.

“Rights” are a moral concept – the concept that provides a logical transition from the principles guiding an individual’s actions to the principles guiding his relationship with others – the concept that preserves and protects individual morality in a social context – the link between the moral code of a man and the legal code of a society, between ethics and politics. Individual rights are the means of subordinating society to moral law. [23]

Mystical philosophy, by contrast, cannot develop an objective doctrine of individual rights, because according to mysticism, men are duty-bound to each other’s needs and desires. The collectivization of men into a herd (or flock) is the political result of the ethics of sacrifice applied to man’s relationship with others. Just as some men expect others to accept their irrational and untenable assertions in the realm of knowledge, those same men will expect others to forfeit their right to property in the realm of morality. The pursuit of the unearned, which is integral to any political theory stemming from the ethics of sacrifice, is the political counterpart to mysticism in epistemology. The desire for the unearned in certainty can only lead to the desire for the unearned in values. Just as knowledge and certainty cannot be the product of one’s “unaided” mind – but must be absorbed via revelations of the ruling consciousness, man’s values – more specifically, the products of the producers – must be appropriated (by coercion or force) from those who produce and redistributed (by divine commandment or popular vote) to those who claim need to them. Thus, the men of ability become enslaved, either by the State, or by the Church, to those who relinquish their minds and neglect their opportunities in life to develop productive ability.

In their establishment of the “right” to the pursuit of the unearned, mystics of every stripe will attempt to conceal the objective concept of man’s individual rights by replacing it with a cheap anti- concept as their alternative. [24] The obliteration of the essentials of man’s individual rights have been so effectively obliterated that most people these days do not recognize public policy designed specifically to rob them of those rights. This fraud begins with the destruction of the concept of individual rights, and from their destroys the reasoning supporting the defense of those rights. We see this so frequently today with the notion of “human rights” or “civil rights” that few dare to question it.

The modern mystics of muscle who offer you the fraudulent alternative of “human rights” versus “property rights,” as if one could exist without the other, are making a last, grotesque attempt to revive the doctrine of the soul versus the body. Only a ghost can exist without material property; only a slave can work with no right to the product of his effort. The doctrine that “human rights” are superior to “property rights” simply means that some human beings have the right to make property out of others; since the competent have nothing to gain from the incompetent, it means the right of the incompetent to own their betters and to use them as productive cattle. Whoever regards this as human and right, has no right to the title of “human.” [25]

If men evade or reject the objective theory of the good, they forfeit their capacity to establish a society of freedom. Without a society of freedom, the individual has no independence from others, and thus must survive by mooching off others, or by allowing others to mooch off himself. This is a choice all men face, but which so many evade as they run to embrace the non-thought, the zero- worship and the ethical suicide of Christianity.

Christian Morality and Brief Reasons Why It is Not Objective

We have already seen good reasons to consider that Christian morality assumes the intrinsic theory of the good, as defined above. Christians themselves may object to this classification, but the facts of the matter will bear this out. As you recall, the intrinsic theory “holds that the good is inherent in certain things or actions as such, regardless of their context and consequences, regardless of any benefit or injury they may cause to the actors or subjects involved”

Numerous items of the Christian view of morality can readily be identified as a perfect fit with this definition. For instance, the Christian deity itself is claimed to be “inherently good,” and that His actions and commandments are “inherently good,” regardless of their relationship to man. God’s actions may make Him appear to be a murdering tyrant [26], but even though such actions work against the lives of the human beings involved, those actions are still asserted as morally right, since they are actions chosen by God, and God is inherently good.

But the marriage between Christian morality and the intrinsic view of the good does not stop there. It is held to be intrinsically good for men to be obedient to the will of God, even if this obedience leads them to despair, depression or even death (as in the case of the model Christian himself, Jesus, in the case of his willing obedience to be crucified). While crucifixion is hardly enjoyable and as such could hardly be considered “good” for man (at least for the one being crucified!), the obedience of a commandment from God which leads to crucifixion would be considered good, since complicity with God’s will is said to honor God’s inherent goodness. (And honoring God’s inherent goodness, we are told, is good, even if it includes your suffering and painful death.)

Since the Bible commands its believers to rely on faith, it is summarily opposed to reason and man’s reliance on it. The repudiation of reason is certainly consistent with a form of morality which expects men to take the commandments of a ruling consciousness as unquestionable moral prescriptions.

Biblical doctrine is explicitly opposed to man’s pride. [27] The Bible can hardly be said to engender one’s “inviolate certainty that his mind is competent to think” for himself. Indeed, the Bible commands men instead to “trust in God with all [his] heart; and lean not unto [his] own understanding.” (Prov. 3:5) And indeed, reading the Bible will hardly generate a conviction that one is worthy of anything except eternal punishment. Instead, the Bible turns man’s capacity for pride into the source of his guilt, and consequently destroys his capacity for self-esteem.

Injunctions against man’s selfishness are always accompanied, either implicitly or explicitly, by slogans and maxims extolling the anti-virtue sacrifice. [28] Sacrifice is “the surrender of a greater value for the sake of a lesser one or of a nonvalue.” [29] Thus, since objective morality is concerned with the individual’s achievement of his values, and not their surrender or forfeiture, sacrifice is literally immoral. One cannot surrender something he does not have or has not already achieved or acquired. Christian morality, by contrast, in its condemnation of man’s self-interest (i.e., his selfishness) and its repudiation of the objective theory of the good, is concerned with their surrender, i.e., sacrifice. Given the principles of the values-based morality, Christianity is thus immoral.

Christianity’s injunctions against man’s selfishness are well known. Selfishness is literally concern with one’s own interests. An action is selfish in nature when one is the primary beneficiary of his own action. Instead of action which benefits oneself, Judeo-Christian morality extols the morality of self- sacrifice as a basic absolute. A Christian believer is taught that he cannot please God and himself at the same time, that he cannot “serve two masters.” [30] If the believer wants to please God, he must obey the moral precepts of the Bible and, in so doing, sacrifice himself. Paul wrote to the budding Roman church, “I beseech you therefore, brethren, by the mercies of God, that ye present your bodies a living sacrifice, holy, acceptable unto God, which is your reasonable service.” [31] Heading one list of vices condemned as paramount sins, Paul mentions “lovers of their own selves” and “lovers of pleasures more than lovers of God.” [32]

Modern secondary sources do not hesitate to mince words in their condemnation of man’s selfishness. The New Unger’s Bible Dictionary, for instance, declares that “sin in its nature is egotism and selfishness. Self is put in the place of God.” [33] Religious moral systems attempt to vilify man’s selfishness by divorcing it from what is taught to be regarded as the good. Man’s selfishness and the good, claim the religious, are ultimately antithetical and mutually exclusive. TheCatholic Encyclopedia’s entry on egoism attempts to make this point when it states:

[The] good is to be sought for its own sake chiefly, and in its train follows happiness as, if the expression may be permitted, an automatic consequence. Hence in pursuing the moral good, I am implicitly pursuing my own happiness. This self-realization is not egoism; for egoism makes self the centre, the beginning and the end of action. On the other hand, the virtuous man sub-ordinates himself to the moral good, which in the last analysis is identified with God.

Just how is happiness supposed to follow as “an automatic consequence,” and exactly whose happiness is that which follows? Exactly what makes something a moral good, and to whom is it said to be good, and why, when one’s own self is disqualified from being the standard of good? This is the intrinsic theory of the good in explicit terms, and it is questions such as these which its defenders resist addressing in terms of essentials. Furthermore, note that one’s happiness cannot be sought for its own sake as a final goal, but must be anticipated to follow somehow (automatically?) when one is allegedly “pursuing the moral good.” This is precisely how “the good” and the objective theory of value are divorced from one another in religious moral teaching.

The attack against the virtue of selfishness always includes the obfuscation of the objective theory of the good, either by mischaracterizing it or by treating an irrationally defined species of egoism as such (e.g., hedonism or whim-based selfishness as opposed to rational selfishness) as exhaustively representative of the objective theory of the good proper. [34] This means the objective theory of the good simply does not get a just hearing. When it is desired to stifle men’s discovery of the objective theory of the good, its detractors have no choice but to destroy the objective theory of value, which of course draws on mystical premises, namely the primacy of consciousness view of reality, metaphysical subjectivism and mystical (i.e., faith-based) epistemology. Of value to whom and why? is not the kind of question intrinsicists are likely to answer in very clear terms.

This is irrescindably evident in statements such as the “good is to be sought for its own sake chiefly,” which we saw above. For in such declarations it is irrevocably implied that that which is called “good” is considered “good” regardless of its value to man, for it is “good” just because. Man’s needs for living his life are thus ultimately irrelevant to the good, particularly if this “good” is said to be “good” with or without man’s benefiting from his pursuit of it. This default is only sealed when one attempts to argue that man benefits automatically, through some means, while these means are left ambiguous and unidentified.

Moreover, if one’s own happiness – which is a value to one’s self (i.e., selfish) – is a moral good, why can it not be a primary value, and why can it not be the final goal of man’s moral actions? Because, we are told, in the hierarchy of values implicit in statements such as we find in the Catholic Encyclopedia, the good (i.e., God) overshadows all values, including man’s happiness, which he must regard as a gift of grace (i.e., unmerited and unearned), not as a product of his own making. Indeed, this repugnant and hateful slap at man is only compounded when we discover that the church’s position, however it defines its terms, is that “true happiness is to come not now, but hereafter.”[35] Such a view can only cheapen man’s life on earth, and as such can only pertain to a morality which essentially holds man’s death as his primary value.

Does this sound like a morality fit for man’s life? Indeed it is not!

The proper resolution to these unnecessary and destructive problems is to root the foundations of one’s philosophy in objectivity and to recognize that man is not guilty by virtue of his existence. If existence exists independent of consciousness, as we discover when we look at reality and see that it does not obey our whims, and if we recognize that man is not guilty simply by virtue of his existence qua man, as Christianity essentially holds, then we should see that man is indeed capable of living a happy life.

Happiness is that state of consciousness which proceeds from the achievement of one’s values. If a man values productive work, his happiness is the measure of his success in the service of his life. But if a man values destruction, like a sadist – or self-torture, like a masochist – or life beyond the grave, like a mystic – or mindless “kicks,” like the driver of a hotrod car – his alleged happiness is the measure of his success in the service of his own destruction. It must be added that the emotional state of all those irrationalists cannot be properly designated as happiness or even as pleasure: it is merely a moment’s relief from their chronic state of terror. [36]

Man’s pursuit of happiness, as Ayn Rand defines it here (finally, an objective definition of this crucial concept), is a profoundly selfish enterprise. To condemn man’s selfishness is to condemn his capacity for living a happy life. Man’s happiness is to be stifled and suppressed, as ultimately, since it is selfish in nature, it is man’s chief source of guilt according to the Christian worldview. Paul wants believers to be so obsessedly absorbed into the Bible’s fear program and mindful of coming peril, that he even advises that “they who rejoice, [to behave] as though they rejoiced not.” [37]

Many who would contend that selfishness is evil while implicitly or explicitly treating happiness as a value (which in such a case ‘happiness’ would now be a stolen concept), will attempt to dichotomize man’s pursuit of his own life in distinction to his pursuit of happiness. This can only result in causing unnecessary psychological discord and an inconsistent approach to values in general, which can only incubate guilt in believers. Man’s pursuit of life and his pursuit of happiness are not to be dichotomized. But man’s life and his happiness are not opposite goals, as Ayn Rand explains:

The maintenance of life and the pursuit of happiness are not two separate issues. To hold one’s own life as one’s ultimate value, and one’s own happiness as one’s highest purpose are two aspects of the same achievement. Existentially, the activity of pursuing rational goals is the activity of maintaining one’s life; psychologically, its result, reward and concomitant is an emotional state of happiness. It is by experiencing happiness that one lives one’s life, in any hour, year or the whole of it. And when one experiences the kind of pure happiness that is an end in itself – the kind that makes one think: “This is worth living for” – what one is greeting and affirming in emotional terms is the metaphysical fact that life is an end in itself. [38]

It is this state of achievement – that is, the success of achieving one’s own values, which those who condemn man’s reason, selfishness and pride intend to destroy in men when they expect him to accept the claim that the good is beyond the grave; that the good is divorced from man’s life needs and values; that the good must be distinguished from that which is practical as opposed to that which is “spiritual”; that the good is something which cannot be earned, something which one cannot achieve through his own rationally productive effort, but something that men should instead passively wait for in the self-deceiving pretense of the hope for a supernatural form of consciousness to distribute it among men without concern for merit (cf. “divine grace”); that the good is ultimately beyond “this reality” and attainable only by the sacrifice of one’s happiness in “this life.” Instead of reasons why men have the right to pursue their own happiness, as the Declaration of Independence acknowledges, Christian morality and similar mystical constructs feed men excuses to evade the moral responsibility of living in the guise of answering to a “higher power” which they cannot comprehend or even prove exists. The cost is man’s life and happiness.

Some may choose to defend their condemnation of man’s selfishness by claiming that a selfish person necessarily, by definition, is one who feeds off others, as if parasitically sapping their life worth dry. But this view neglects the fact that the ethics of sacrifice always breeds two kinds of persons: those who sacrifice their values to others, and those who collect on those sacrifices. Can one expect that men should accept as a duty the commandment that they should sacrifice their values to others and there not be someone ready to collect those sacrifices? The affirmation of the ethics of sacrifice conjoined with the condemnation of those who subsist on the sacrifices of others ignores the fact that the collectors of sacrifice need those who are willing to sacrifice their values as much as those who sacrifice their values need someone ready to collect them. Those who sacrifice their values do so primarily for the momentary relief from the chronic guilt they have accepted as a primary condition of living. Thus, it is not merely the exchange of sacrifices which takes place in this neurotic dialogue, but the reinforcement of the psychological sanctions motivating such forfeiture of value.

Additionally, mystics may attempt the cheap trick of arguing that God is the collector of man’s sacrifices, choosing instead to refer to God in this capacity as the recipient of man’s tribute or object of his worship. But this is clearly an idle and empty route, for what value can one give to a perfect, immortal and indestructible being? Does one sacrifice to a rock? Of course not; a rock could have no use for man’s values; a rock can neither value nor endure loss. For the same essential reason, the idea that an immortal and indestructible God could value anything is necessarily incoherent. [39] Besides, if God were omnipotent, and has virtually unlimited creative ability (able to zap into existence entire universes and the such), then God could easily provide his own values for his own needs, as if ‘need’ and ‘value’ could apply to such a being.

The answer of course is for us to discover the objective theory of the good and for the individual to declare his independence from others and for him to produce his own values – not at the expense of others, but at his own expense, and not to allow others to mooch off him in their hopes that he, as a producer, will sacrifice his product (i.e., his values) to them at his own expense. Those who allow others to mooch off themselves naturally will expect to mooch off others as well. This breeds unnecessary dependence on others, which can only work against man’s life because it deceives men into thinking they can exist by evading the responsibility of living. The objective theory of the good not only stresses the value of the individual’s independence from others, it is the only moral doctrine which makes it possible.

Independence is the recognition of the fact that yours is the responsibility of judgment and nothing can help you escape it – that no substitute can do your thinking, as no pinch-hitter can live your life – that the vilest form of self-abasement and self-destruction is the subordination of your mind to the mind of another, the acceptance of an authority over your brain, the acceptance of his assertions as facts, his say-so as truth, his edicts as middle-man between your consciousness and existence. [40]

And here we come full circle, from cause to effect, and from effect tracing back to its cause. The commandment for men to sacrifice their values is the commandment that men should sacrifice their minds. The commandment that men should believe as the priests dictate them to believe, is the commandment that men should subjugate their minds and disable their capacity to reason for themselves. The condemnation of selfishness is the ruse of cheating man from his own vital happiness. To hold sacrifice as a virtue is to negate man’s ability to lead his life independent of others, just so that those who seek the unearned may profit at his expense. This is the morality of the moocher, the ethics of the parasite, the code of the evader and the doctrine of the mystic, all in one shabby tomb crowned with the symbol of the cross, a symbol not of death as such, but a symbol of slow suffering and agony. As such, there could be no more appropriate symbol for Christianity than an instrument of torture and execution.

Concluding Remarks

These are the concepts and their respective definitions which will be assumed in my assessment of the claim that Christian morality is objective in nature. Already it should be clear from the definitions I have given that this claim cannot true, but rather that Christian morality is intrinsic in nature. But I am willing to be patient with my readers, and to show systematically, going through the verses of the Bible themselves, why Christian morality as defined particularly in the New Testament cannot be considered objective, but is indeed a product of a false view of reality, the primacy of consciousness metaphysics, and therefore wholly unfit for man.

Notes
[1] Ayn Rand, Glossary of Objectivist Definitions, ed. Allison T. Kunze and Jean F. Moroney, s.v. ‘ethics’; see also Rand’s essay “The Objectivist Ethics,” The Virtue of Selfishness, p. 13; and, Leonard Peikoff, Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand, p. 206.
[2] Footnote: The dependence of political principles on moral principles is rarely understood or acknowledged by many thinkers. Political principles – that is, principles guiding one’s interactions with others, how they treat and conduct themselves in relation to others – are often treated as primaries which cannot be questioned. Political theory, at least at the interpersonal level (as opposed to the societal level) is quite often supplanted in place of a doctrine of morality, and even mistakenly referred to as morality proper. This practice leaves political principles without an objective basis, and also leaves the individual clueless on how he should conduct his own life in relation to his own values, and why. These mistakes are avoided in Objectivism.
[3] Ayn Rand, “Galt’s Speech,” For the New Intellectual, p. 122. [4] Leonard Peikoff, Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand, p.117. [5] “What is Capitalism?” Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal, p. 22. [6] Ibid., p. 21. [7] Ibid., pp. 21-22.
[8] See for instance Erwin Lutzer’s Measuring Morality: A Comparison of Ethical Systems which affirms that “God’s moral revelation has intrinsic value,” which is a contradiction in terms according to rational philosophy. If the supposed value of God’s moral revelation is intrinsic, which means: the value of God’s moral revelation is a value in and of itself (which means: without reference to man), then it is not of value to man. Can this supposed revelation be a value to God? Again, not if its value is supposedly intrinsic. Besides, we already know that an immortal being such as God cannot value to begin with, as I demonstrate in my essay Why an Immortal God Cannot Value. Clearly, if we grant Lutzer’s claim legitimacy, then God’s alleged moral revelation is of no value to anyone.
[9] Rand, “Galt’s Speech,” For the New Intellectual, p. 121.
[10] Rand, “The Objectivist Ethics,” The Virtue of Selfishness, p. 15.
[11] Ayn Rand, “The Objectivist Ethics,” The Virtue of Selfishness, p. 20.
[12] Ayn Rand, “Faith and Force: The Destroyers of the Modern World,” Philosophy: Who Needs It, p. 62.
[13] “This is John Galt Speaking,” For the New Intellectual, p. 121.
[14] Ayn Rand, “The Objectivist Ethics,” The Virtue of Selfishness, p. 22. [15] “This is John Galt Speaking,” For the New Intellectual, p. 170. [16] Ayn Rand, “The Objectivist Ethics,” The Virtue of Selfishness, p. 28. [17] Rand, “This is John Galt Speaking,” For the New Intellectual, p. 128. [18] Ibid.
[19] I urge theology students who may be reading this to honestly ask themselves: What legitimately necessary goal do all your efforts to develop so-called “theories” and “doctrines” pertinent to god-belief accomplish?
[20] Ibid., p. 130. [21] Ibid. [22] Ayn Rand, “Man’s Rights,” The Virtue of Selfishness, p. 93. [23] Ibid.
[24] By “anti-concept” I mean “an unnecessary and rationally unusable term designed to replace and obliterate some legitimate concept. The use of anti-concepts gives the listeners a sense of approximate understanding. But in the realm of cognition, nothing is as bad as the approximate.” (Ayn Rand, “Credibility and Polarization,” The Ayn Rand Letter, I, 1, 1.)
[25] Ayn Rand, “This is John Galt Speaking,” For the New Intellectual, p. 183. [26] For a small sampling of this, see Donald Morgan’s Bible Atrocities.
[27] For instance, see Proverbs 8:13; 11:12; 13:10; 14:3; 16:18; 29:23; Mark 7:22; I John 2:16.
[28] If ‘virtue’ is that action by which one achieves and/or preserves his values, then an ‘anti-virtue’ is the action by which those values are forfeited and destroyed. It is in this context that I consider both ’selflessness’ and ’sacrifice’ to be anti-virtues.
[29] Ayn Rand, “The Ethics of Emergencies,” The Virtue of Selfishness, p. 44. This definition isolates the essentials involved in the concept ’sacrifice’ far better than others I have found. Webster’s II New Riverside Dictionary, for instance, defines ’sacrifice’ as: “forfeiture of something valuable for something else.” This definition neglects to identify the relationship of that “something else” to the “something valuable” being forfeited; it does not tell us that value being forfeited is of higher value than the one which is not being sacrificed. This source also defines ’sacrifice’ as “A loss,” which – although sacrifice results in a net loss to the one who sacrifices something – also gives only part of the story. For this does not take into account that the sacrifice of values is a loss chosen by the one who sacrifices something.
[30] Cf. Matt. 6:24; Luke 16:13.
[31] Romans 12:1.
[32] II Timothy 3:2, 4.
[33] S.v. ’sin’.
[34] Cf. the fallacy of frozen abstraction.
[35] Quoted from the Catholic Encyclopedia’s entry for ‘happiness’.
[36] Ayn Rand, “The Objectivist Ethics,” The Virtue of Selfishness, p. 28.
[37] I Cor. 7:30. Compare this urgency to suppress one’s emotions with passages commanding men to rejoice: Romans 12:15; I Cor. 13:6; Phil. 3:1, 4:4; I Peter 4:13; etc. Attempting to integrate these instructions – both to rejoice and to conduct oneself “as though [he] rejoiced not” – can only stifle man’s capacity for rationally-achieved happiness, not liberate it. Such slantradictions as I call them are designed especially to cause confusion in the minds of believers, and ultimately guilt, when all one needs to do is declare his own independence and pursue the non-contradictory joy, which Rand extolled. (Cf. “This is John Galt Speaking,” For the New Intellectual, p. 132.)
[38] Ibid., p. 29. [39] See particularly my essay Why an Immortal God Cannot Value. [40] “This is John Galt Speaking,” For the New Intellectual, p. 128.

Do you love Jesus?

How the statement “I love Jesus” contradicts itself

Love is one’s commitment to values, and is profoundly selfish in nature. [1]

According to the New Testament, Jesus is a symbol of self-sacrifice, not of self-value.

The New Testament is clear that Jesus is God’s disposable son. As we read in John 3:16, “For God so loved the world, that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have eternal life.” So far as God is concerned, Jesus’ life is meaningless unless he sacrifices it in the fulfillment of God’s long-ranging “plan” for the salvation of sinners.

As Jesus said in his prayer to the ruling consciousness in Matthew 26:39, “…not as I will, but as thou wilt.” Jesus offered himself a willing sacrifice, “and became obedient unto death, even the death of the cross.” (Phil. 2:8) New Testament authors apparently held that this sacrifice is the most important and meaningful point of Jesus’ life and ministry. For without Jesus’ sacrifice, believers would have no forgiveness of sins.

Followers of Christ are expected to emulate Jesus’ sacrifice in the conduct of their lives. In his letter to the Roman church, Paul wrote, “I beseech you therefore, brethren, by the mercies of God, that ye present your bodies a living sacrifice, holy, acceptable unto God, which is your reasonable service.” (Rom. 12:1) According to this view, the sacrifice of oneself is a moral duty, a prescription not open to the believer’s choice.

We read in John 15:13: “Greater love hath no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends.” Thus love, according to the Bible, is measured by one’s willingness to surrender his chief values, not by one’s achievement and/or preservation of values. But this in and of itself has obvious contradictory implications, for one cannot surrender values before he has achieved them. It is then to be inferred that the authors of the New Testament took the achievement and security of values completely for granted.

According to the Bible, Jesus clearly stood for sacrifice. Jesus’ death on the cross, according to statements attributed to him by the gospel authors, is the New Testament’s concretization of this surrender of values. According to the New Testament’s own portrayal, virtue (Jesus) is sacrificed for the sake of vice (sinners). Jesus is thus to be praised for this supreme act of sacrifice, which the gospel narratives build up in the minds of believing readers in the culminating tension of their depiction of Jesus’ ministry and their respective passion scenes.

In John 12:25 (cf. also Matthew 16:25, Mark 8:35 and Luke 9:24), we find the following statement attributed to Jesus: “He that loveth his life shall lose it: and he that hateth his life in this world shall keep it unto life eternal.” In other words, one who holds his own life to be a primary value and is committed to acting to preserve it, is to be condemned. Conversely, one who hates and willingly sacrifices his life – i.e., one whose actions are not committed to preserving his own life, the one thing that gives him the ability to achieve and hold values to begin with, will be rewarded. In more blunt terms, those who love are condemned, while those who hate are rewarded.

Here the paradox gives away the contradiction between one’s ability to love and the condemnation he is to receive for it, while his willingness to act in defiance of his own values is considered a praiseworthy virtue. This can only be interpreted, if taken seriously and applied consistently, that one’s own life should not be a primary value to oneself and that whatsoever one loves, if not Jesus, will come between him and Jesus. [2]

Those who love (i.e., those who are committed to their values) are not people who sacrifice themselves or their values. They act to achieve, protect and preserve what they value. A man who loves his wife, for instance, does not demonstrate his love by sacrificing her to slave drivers, thieves or moral parasites; he does not surrender virtue for the sake of vice. Instead, he acts in the interest of his values, to protect his wife from that which may threaten her existence. He does not stand idly by with his head ducked in futile prayer while his wife lies in pain after an auto accident. Instead, he acts desperately to save her life and minimize her suffering in any way possible. Why? Because he recognizes that she is of profound, selfish value to himself. Without her presence in his life, he would not achieve the kind of deeply satisfying joy that her presence makes possible in his life. Since deeply satisfying joy of this nature is what makes his life worth living, he will act to protect her. This is the action of a man who recognizes what he values, and why.

Love is incompatible with sacrifice. Sacrifice is the surrender of a higher value for the sake of a lesser value or a non-value. Love is the commitment to achieving and protecting values, while sacrifice is the commitment to their loss. Love and sacrifice are committed to opposite ends.

According to biblical philosophy, the sacrifice of one’s own life to one’s god-belief is the highest moral duty, as exemplified by the climax of Jesus’ ministry, the crucifixion. Jesus is known, not for what he achieved, but for what he gave up. Likewise, the believer is expected to “lose his life,” according to Jesus, for the sake of an admittedly implausible hope [3], a hope which one cannot see or touch. (Cf. Romans 8:24, II Corinthians 5:7, Hebrews 11:1, et al.) But one cannot have any hopes, valid or invalid, unless he is conscious, and one cannot be conscious unless he is alive. A hope which expects one to deny and lose his own life is a contradiction, an anti-life fantasy which the doctrines and the theology of the Bible and its defenders intend to validate.

To “love” Jesus, then, is to love a symbol of self-sacrifice. But self-sacrifice is the repudiation of oneself, and therefore of one’s own values, thus denying the very basis of love. Consequently, the statement “I love Jesus” amounts to “I love what makes love impossible for me.”
Thus, when a Christian says “I love Jesus,” he is effectively contradicting himself, whether he knows it or not.

Notes:
[1] For a defense of the objective theory of morality and the selfishness of values, see Ayn Rand’s “The Objectivist Ethics,” in her book The Virtue of Selfishness, pp. 13-35. Readers may also be interested in Tara Smith’s Viable Values: A Study of Life as the Root and Reward of Morality, (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000), 205 pages, including works consulted and index. For relevant discussions of the topic of man’s values and their selfish nature, see the following articles:
Life as the Standard of Value
Objectivity and the Proof of Egoism by Robert Hartford
The Categories, Values, and Value Principles by Robert Hartford
Is Altruism Benevolent? by Diana Mertz Hsieh
Introductory Treatise on Morality by Anton Thorn

[2] The Bible is certainly not without mixed messages here by any means. For in one passage (Luke 15:4), Jesus is reported to have said, “What man of you, having an hundred sheep, if he lose one of them, doth not leave the ninety and nine in the wilderness, and go after that which is lost, until he find it?” In other words, one is here naturally expected to act in the direct interest of his values. The practicality of such examples sparsely seasoning Jesus’ folksy wisdom tends, in the minds of believers, to mollify the value-damning spirit of his overall message in other passages. The problem is that such contradictory messages continue to reverberate in the psychology of believers, causing them to compartmentalize their worldview into unintegrated package-deals cut off from one another and enabling the murmuring tension of the evangelical mind-game of the Bible to appear valid in the minds of believers.

[3] I have in mind here Tertullian’s own words, “[T]he Son of God died; it is by all means to be believed because it is absurd. And he was buried and rose again; the fact is certain, because it is impossible.” (De Carne Christi, ch. 5.)

Why An Immortal God Cannot Value And Therefore Cannot Love or Know Purpose

The Argument from Moral Values for the Non-Existence of the Christian God

Most theistic religions assert a God (or gods) that is the source of existence. Many also claim that this same being is the source of morality and of moral values. Such claims are commonly issued by apologists for Christianity. But these assertions lead us to ask many provocative questions. For instance, can the Christian God have moral values? Can the Christian God love? Can the Christian God have a purpose?

These are the questions that will be considered in this essay by analyzing the concepts against the claims made by Christians about the nature of their God. in this essay, I will examine whether or not a being defined as the Christians define their God, if such a being were to exist, could value, love and/or place before itself any purpose at all. Essentially, the question boils down to: Can the Christian God have a moral nature?

An Eternal, Immortal God?

Christians claim that their God is immortal. I Timothy 1:17 states: “Now unto the King eternal, immortal, invisible, the only wise God, be honor and glory for ever and ever. Amen.” (Underscore added; see also Deut. 33:27, Isaiah 57:15 and Heb. 9:14.) ‘Eternal’ means ‘out of time,’ ‘not constrained by time’ or ‘inapplicable to time.’ ‘Immortal’ means non-mortal, which means, ‘does not or cannot die.’ An ‘eternal, immortal’ being, then, is a being which allegedly has always existed, which will exist forever without end, which will never die. Such a being is therefore indestructible and unaffected by its environment in any adverse way. This is the idea of the Christian God.

Now there is no example in nature of an ‘eternal, immortal’ entity that is also a living being. All forms of life on earth, whether they are primitive single-celled paramecia or bacteria, plant life, lesser invertebrates, reptiles, birds, mammals or man, have a typical life expectancy which they only rarely outlive. And even should an animal or other living being outlive its life expectancy, it will surely die sometime thereafter. That is the nature of all living beings: eventually the activity of life ceases and another takes its place among the living. [1]

Therefore, the assertion of an ‘eternal, immortal’ life form, being an outstanding claim, is without natural precedent or justification. “So be it!” says the apologist, “That’s the nature of God! He is supernatural! He is the way He is, and He shall always be so!” The intention at this point of my essay is to grant the apologist his wishes for an ‘eternal, immortal’ God for the time being, for the purpose of demonstrating the incongruity of the claim that God can value, love and act purposefully. Indeed, in many places (most notably in the New Testament), the Bible asserts that this immortal being called “God” is capable of loving both individuals and entire nations, as these online Bible search results demonstrate.

Is the assertion of an eternal, immortal being incongruous with the concepts value, purpose and love? Yes, it is. Why is this, do you ask? This is the central question under consideration in this essay, and the answer constitutes the main content of my present argument.

A Conspicuous Dearth of Definitions

The first thing that must be done at this point is to clarify the concepts in question, namely value, purpose and love. Without this clarification, without the proper identification of one’s terms, no rationality can proceed. In this sense, rationality is crucially dependent on one’s volition: We can only employ and reason consistently with proper definitions if we choose to; one cannot be forced to use reason in his cognition. Thus, without the proper exercise of one’s volitional faculties, one is doomed to arbitrary choices, and the results of such default can only be irrational.

Where shall we look for concise and objective definitions for these terms? Our first inclination might be to consult religious sources to acquire familiarity of what definitions religious doctrines themselves presume. In the case of Christianity, we should then seek our definitions in the Bible. But, sadly, concise and objective definitions are not to be found in the Bible, for the Bible gives definitions to precious few words at all. The meanings of the words used in biblical writings are commonly presumed without any attempt to identify in explicit terms what those definitions are. Instead, they must be inferred by context and usage.

For instance, I once asked a believer how the Bible defines the concept ‘truth’. He cited John 14:6, which states, “Jesus saith unto him, ‘I am the way, the truth, and the life: no man cometh unto the Father, but by me.’” Clearly this is unworkable if we are to equate the concept ‘truth’, which is an abstraction, with Jesus, which is (allegedly) an entity. Such verses, far from offering definitions of key terms, simply presume their meaning and the reader’s knowledge of their meaning. The statement “Jesus is truth” has no more meaning than “Jesus is blaff” if we do not have a prior understanding of what ‘truth’ means. This is the evasion of definition, not the fulfillment thereof.

We run into the same dead end when we look for definitions of concepts such as ‘value’, ‘love’ and ‘purpose’ in the Bible. And when this failing is pointed out (why a text should be held as an authoritative guide on life and knowledge when it does not even articulate its own definitions is never explained), we are told that the Bible is not a dictionary. If apologists are happy with this conclusion, then why would they go to the trouble of claiming that verses like John 14:6 offer definitions of important terms?

The Bible barely even mentions the word ‘value’, even though its authors had optimum occasion to address this crucial philosophical concern had they considered it important. My copy of Strong’s Exhaustive Concordance of the Bible lists seven passages which use the term ‘value’ [2]; four passages which use the term ‘valued’ [3]; and one passage containing the word ‘valuest’. [4] Neither passage offers a definition of this term, but instead assumes the reader’s understanding of the term and some hint of its moral meaning, even though this meaning is never explicitly identified. For instance, the passage in Job 28 extols the incomparability of the value of wisdom with that of gold. However, it is never explained why gold should command such unanimous agreement among men as to its value. This is simply assumed, which makes for very careless philosophy.

Additionally, I have consulted supplemental sources in addition to the Bible in order to find definitions of the terms ‘value’, ‘love’ and ‘purpose’. For instance, The New Unger’s Bible Dictionary [5] lacks entries for both ‘value’ and ‘purpose’, but includes an entry for ‘love’. In the entry for ‘love’ it states that love is “[c]hiefly represented in the Scriptures as an attribute of God and as a Christian virtue. Its consideration, therefore, belongs to both theology and ethics.” But does the Bible Dictionary offer a definition of ‘love’? If it does, it certainly is not very clearly stated. The entry twice equates love with “affection,” and also with “feeling” and “tender and passionate attachment, a sentiment of [man's] nature excited by qualities in another person or thing that command our affection.” But this still does not define ‘love’ in terms of essentials. It also states that love is “a virtue of such efficacy that it is said to be the fulfilling of the law.” But if this were the case, what would one need the law for in the first place?

Furthermore, the entry for ‘love’ in Unger’s nowhere mentions the role of values in determining what and why man loves or should love. This is a glaring omission, for how can one pontificate on love without reference to values? Sadly, Unger’s aligns itself with the tired, worn-out anti-man tradition of disparaging man’s capacity for love. For the same entry states that love “is the antithesis of selfishness.” But love is irrescindably selfish in nature. According to whose values-hierarchy does one love anything? Certainly, one loves according to his own values-hierarchy. Whose emotions are affected when one achieves or loses an important value? One’s own emotions. According to Rand, a so-called selfless love in the context of personal relationships, “would have to mean that you derive no personal pleasure or happiness from the company and the existence of the person you love, and that you are motivated only by self-sacrificial pity for that person’s need of you.” [6] The view of love which Rand describes here is perfectly compatible with religious ideas which condemn man’s selfishness as evil.

At the same time, Unger’s offers the contradiction that the “contention… that true Christian love should be disinterested, that we must love God exclusively on account of His perfection, so that if He did not bless us, but were to cast us off, we would love Him still, finds no support in the Scriptures.” But if it is the case that love “is the antithesis of selfishness,” then how could love not be disinterested? Unger’s does not say, nor does it appear ready to recognize its own contradictions.

Next, I looked at the online Catholic Encyclopedia, specifically under entries beginning with the letter ‘v’, to find its definition of ‘value’. Amazingly, there was no listing for this so crucial philosophical term. How peculiar that those who have so highly placed themselves in charge of matters of morality should fail to discuss the very unit of that branch of philosophy!

Similarly, although the Catholic Encyclopedia does include an entry for ‘love’, it fails to include an entry for ‘purpose’ (see entries beginning with the letter ‘p’). While the editors of the Catholic Encyclopedia consider the terms ‘virtue’ and ‘truth’ to be important philosophical and/or theological terms meriting respective entries, it is to be inferred by their absence that the terms ‘value’ and ‘purpose’ must figure quite loosely at best in Catholic philosophy. The same inference can be made for Christianity proper, for its primary sources’ default in the same.

Rational Definitions

Fortunately, we have a rational philosophy, Objectivism, which is most careful when it comes to the vital need of definition. The vital need fulfilled by definitions is the comprehensibility of the meaning of our speech and writing, of the words we use, and consequently, any points we try to make. But while the Bible holds man’s understanding in low regard (cf. Proverbs 3:5 et al.), Objectivism holds that definitions are “the guardians of rationality, the first line of defense against the chaos of mental disintegration.” [7] In tandem with this, Objectivism holds that the “truth or falsehood of all of man’s conclusions, inferences, thought and knowledge rests on the truth or falsehood of his definitions.” [8] Given Objectivism’s unique and refreshing willingness to insist on clear definitions, one should not object to consulting Objectivist sources for definitions of important terms when other sources default in this regard, as we saw above.

Objectivism holds that life as such is the root of morality. According to Objectivism,

[t]here is only one fundamental alternative in the universe: existence or non-existence – and it pertains to a single class of entities: to living organisms. The existence of inanimate matter is unconditional, the existence of life is not: it depends on a specific course of action. Matter is indestructible, it changes its forms, but it cannot cease to exist. It is only a living organism that faces a constant alternative: the issue of life or death. Life is a process of self-sustaining and self-generated action. [9]

Since man is a living organism, he faces the alternative which Rand mentions above. Man exists, and can cease to exist. “Like other organisms,” writes Objectivist Eyal Mozes, “man needs to act in order to survive; but unlike other organisms, man does not take the needed actions automatically. Man must choose to act to sustain his own life, and find out how to do so. That is why man needs morality.” [10]

According to Objectivism, morality is a “code of values to guide man’s choices and actions.” [11] Since man faces the fundamental alternative of existence versus non-existence, he must act in order to live. Thus, just as he requires a code of principles to guide his thinking, which is reason, he also requires a code of values which guides his choices and actions.

Miss Rand defines ‘value’ as

that which one acts to gain and/or keep. The concept ‘value’ is not a primary; it presupposes an answer to the question: of value to whom and for what? It presupposes an entity capable of acting to achieve a goal in the face of an alternative. Where no alternative exists, no goals and no values are possible. [12]

This definition assumes alternatives open to choice. For instance, one may value spending one’s evenings after a day at work taking a course on computer programming instead of whiling away his evenings in front of a television. This presupposes that one values one activity over the other, which means, broadly speaking: value as such depends on those capable of valuing. Thus, value presupposes conscious living beings which are aware of alternative goals and capable of choosing between them.

In conjunction with this view of ‘value’, ‘love’ is defined as “an emotion proceeding from the evaluation of an existent as a positive value and as a source of pleasure.” [13] Thus, love is directly harmonious with one’s values. One loves something because he determines that something to be of benefit to him for some reason.

For instance, if one values his own skills and the fulfilling rewards they make possible in his life, he likely loves his ability and the values he earns with that ability. In the case of the person spending his evenings after work taking courses in computer programming, he does so because he values the education he is learning and the values which that education may make possible for him to achieve in the future. Since he likely recognizes that the achievement of values is not guaranteed by his efforts, his love for those values and the joy they bring to his life supplies him with the motivation necessary to invest his energy in pursuing an education in his “off hours.” This is indisputably and profoundly selfish, for he is the primary benefaciary of his own actions, and he invests in maximizing the value-achieving potential of his actions. [14]

With the same care for essentials, Dr. Leonard Peikoff defines ‘purpose’ as “conscious goal-directedness in every aspect of one’s existence where choice applies.” [15] It is with the purpose of attaining a chosen goal or accomplishing a chosen objective that one acts. Purposeful action in this sense is that action which one sets in motion in order to achieve, maintain or preserve his values. For animate beings, the ultimate objective of that purpose is expected to achieve is life. Without life, purpose is not possible, just as values are not possible without life. [16]

The Objectivist concept of purpose coherently integrates the nature of a living being’s need for goal-directed action and the need to choose between alternatives, just as the concepts of ‘value’ and ‘love’ above do. If there is no fundamental alternative, what could possibly guide such choices and actions, and what goal can such action be directed in achieving?

The assertion of the concept ‘purpose’ assumes that its achievement and fulfillment are possible, at least within the general context of reality. It is arbitrary to speak of a goal which by its nature is said never to be achievable. If something is by nature never achievable, then what qualifies it as a goal? And if it does not qualify as a goal, what is the purpose of pursuing it? Thus, when the Bible speaks of an “eternal purpose” (Eph. 3:11), we are right to ask: What did its authors have in mind? And if an “eternal purpose” is a purpose which by its very nature can never be fulfilled, why should anyone attempt to pursue it?

The Heart of the Matter

The essential premise to keep in mind is the fact that value, love and purpose can only apply to a certain class of entities, namely living entities. In each case, we see how the meanings of these concepts presuppose certain conditions which belong only to this class of entities. We do not say that non-living things can value or love, or that they can engage in purposive action apart from the context of their relationship to living beings which control them (such as a machine designed to achieve a certain goal for those who produced it and/or manage it). It is only the class of living entities which faces the alternative of existence or non-existence, and only these entities which can generate their own action to make their existence possible.

“But God is a living being!” claim the religionists in their objection to perceived molestation of their age-held beliefs. “God is living, He is a living being, He is the source of life itself! He alone is the Creator of life, and therefore the Author of value, love and purpose!” Such claims will be asserted in the face of facts that contradict their mystical nature.

But if ‘god’ is immortal – i.e., if ‘god’ cannot die, then how can it be said that ‘god’ is a living being? The concept ‘life’ can only be meaningful if in fact the entity to which it is applied faces the alternative life vs. death. If this is not the case with ‘god,’ then the term life is misapplied.

Of central importance here is the fact that the concepts ‘value,’ ‘love,’ and ‘purpose’ can only apply to living beings which face the alternative life vs. death. This is because, as Ayn Rand writes, “It is only the concept of ‘Life’ that makes the concept of ‘Value’ possible. It is only to a living entity that things can be good or evil.” [17] Thus, it must be pointed out that ‘value’ finds its meaning in ‘life’.

Objectivist Tara Smith confirms the truth of this position when she argues that the

nature of value can be fully appreciated only by understanding what gives rise to value… Thus it is crucial to understand what renders something valuable… Rand observes that life gives rise to the very concept of value. The alternative of life or death is what allows and what necessitates the pursuit of values. The quest for life makes the idea of value intelligible and imposes the need to identify values and to act to achieve them. Thus, it is life that mandates human beings’ adherence to a moral code. Life is the end of value and establishes the standard of value. As such, it is the source of moral obligations, which are prescriptions for how to achieve that end. [18]

Indeed, if man did not face the fundamental alternative of life or death, or existence vs. non-existence, Objectivism argues that he would have no need or capacity for values. In fact, Smith argues, “Humans are not alone in seeking values. To the extent that plants and animals act to acquire certain objects – for example, growing toward the sunlight or scurrying to find nuts – they are also pursuing values.” [19] In other words, since both plants and animals are living entities, and consequently face the same fundamental alternative which man faces, namely live vs. death, they too require values as well, even though they do not possess the cognitive faculties needed to form the concept ‘value’ itself. Life as such, therefore, is the metaphysical precondition which makes values possible.

But a rock, for instance, does not pursue values because it does not face the same alternative, life vs. death. A rock neither generates its own action, nor is any action it is caused to do goal-directed in nature (that is, in relation to itself). A rock does not need nutrients in order to exist, nor does it need shelter or warmth. Why is this? Because it is not living, because it does not face the same alternative as living entities.

Similarly, a being which is said to be immortal by definition would not face this fundamental alternative, just as the rock does not. If an entity does not face this fundamental alternative, even if one wants to argue that this entity is conscious, it still could not value. As Rand argues:

To make this point fully clear, try to imagine an immortal, indestructible robot, an entity which moves and acts, but which cannot be affected by anything, which cannot be changed in any respect, which cannot be damaged, injured or destroyed. Such an entity would not be able to have any values; it would have nothing to gain or to lose; It could not regard anything as for or against it, as serving or threatening its welfare, as fulfilling or frustrating its interests. It could have no interests and no goals… Only a living entity can have goals or can originate them. And it is only a living organism that has the capacity for self-generated, goal-directed action. [20]

If God does not face a fundamental alternative as man does (i.e., if God does not face the alternative existence vs. non-existence), then God cannot be said to possess the metaphysical precondition which makes values possible. And if God does not possess the metaphysical precondition that makes values possible (i.e., the fundamental alternative existence vs. non-existence), then God cannot know value at all. Such a being could know no loss, especially if such a being were also omnipotent, which means that there would be nothing that is impossible to such a being.

In regard to the notion of an immortal agent of value, Tara Smith asks,

If a person were assured of going on forever, what sense could it make to regard some states of affairs as better than others? I am not merely imagining a person’s life being extended by decades or centuries. Rather, imagine his life being literally endless. He is indestructible and will live for all eternity. Whatever the person did this afternoon, he would have an infinite amount of time to do other thing things. He would incur no loss by choosing one activity rather than some other…. Whatever a destruction-proof robot or immortal being does is not sustaining its existence since that is already guaranteed. Where survival is inherently assured and death is impossible, then, we are no longer talking about life. Rand’s robot is not a living being; that is why she calls it a robot. [21]

The Christian God, then, essentially resembles the indestructible robot in the example which Rand provides. Like the indestructible robot, the Christian God is said to be “immortal, indestructible…, an entity which moves and acts, but which cannot be affected by anything, which cannot be changed in any respect, which cannot be damaged, injured or destroyed.” Like Rand’s robot, the Christian God “would have nothing to gain or to lose,” nor could the Christian God “regard anything as for or against it, as serving or threatening its welfare, as fulfilling or frustrating its interests.”

How, then, can Christians claim that their immortal, indestructible, and unchanging God be capable of valuing anything? Certainly, they cannot claim this, if they assume objectively defined terms. And if the Christian God could not value anything, then it could not love anything, nor could it be capable of pursuing any purpose. Since the very notion of the Christian God denies the genetic roots of the concepts ‘value’, ‘love’ and ‘purpose’, any attempt to assert the Christian God as capable of these virtues reduces to conceptual fallacy. In particular, such attempts would commit the fallacy of the stolen concept, which renders invalidates such ambitions.

Therefore, since God is immortal, it does not face the fundamental alternative of existence vs. non-existence. And since it does not face this fundamental alternative, it cannot value. And since it cannot value, it cannot have a code of values, and thus cannot be a moral being. Neither can it love, nor can it have a purpose. Thus, because of its own internal incoherence, the notion of the Christian God is invalid. Such a being cannot exist.

Possible Objections and Counter-Positions

Religious apologists will no doubt attempt to raise objections against the argument from moral values for the non-existence of the Christian God. Below I consider what I consider to be the most common objections I’ve encountered.

1. “God may be immortal and indestructible, but He can value, love and know purpose anyway.”This species of objection will usually attempt to rely on some argumentation which is designed to replace objective definitions with plastic definitions which can be molded at whim in order both to satisfy atheological criticism of god-belief as well as dispel it at the same time.For instance, one might assert that we need not assume a fundamental alternative as the basis of values, but instead that certain objects have inherent value, i.e., value apart from moral agents. This is essentially the intrinsic theory of values, which does not persevere under objective scrutiny. [22] The intrinsic theory of values is basically the attempt to acontextualize values from man’s nature; i.e., the attempt to dissociate values from a values-hierarchy, and consequently from a knowledge-hierarchy. Objectivism insists that all knowledge is hierarchical in nature, and consequently that values are hierarchical as well. If every instance of value were itself a primary that could be asserted without reference to a fundamental standard, one may have room to argue for this view of moral values. But since such views cannot adequately answer such fundamental questions as, Of value to whom? and Of value for what? – and since such views evade the rational integration of knowledge with values, of epistemology and morality, and the fact that the necessities of life give rise to values, they cannot properly be called values.

   Therefore, any objection taking this route is merely an attempt to evade the objective theory of values and the facts of reality (e.g., the fact that moral values have objective identity).

2. “It does not matter if God is immortal and indestructible, God is the basis of all value, and therefore of love and purpose, and one cannot assert these latter concepts without presupposing the existence of the Christian God in the first place.”
   This would-be objection smacks of so-called “presuppositionalist” apologetics, a scheme of theistic defenses which argue that Christian theism supplies the ontological and epistemological pre-conditions of all intelligibility, including the intelligibility of moral codes. Though presuppositionalism has not shown itself to endure sustained criticism [23], this approach to defending Christian theism is gaining more and more popularity, and thus such an objection may likely be encountered.

   The problem with this objection, however, is that the notion of ‘god’ is completely superfluous in the context of man’s capacity to value, love and choose moral purposes. As the definitions and arguments I supply above amply demonstrate, the basis of man’s capacity for moral value is first and foremost the fact that he faces a fundamental, metaphysical alternative, namely existence vs. non-existence. Regardless of one’s god-beliefs or lack thereof, the fact that man must act in order to sustain his life is indisputable. Asserting that the Christian God is the foundation of man’s moral nature as such, or of moral values as such, simply begs the question, and ignores those principles which I identify above. Such an objection, if engaged, is properly identified as an evasion of the objective theory of values and of man’s nature as a rational being.

3. “I don’t care, I admit that my definitions may not be objective, but I still believe God can value and act in his own interests regardless of what reason tells me.”
   This strategy is properly identified as the “whole faith” strategy, since it blatantly rejects rationality and objectivity, and asserts its desired conclusions in opposition to reason regardless of its resulting cognitive fallout. Such a position may not be intellectually honest, but it is at least consistent with the rudiments of the religious view of the world. The religious view of the world has historically condemned man’s ability to comprehend or at the very least relegated it to an inferior and undesirable position (cf. Proverbs 3:5). Additionally, this same view of the world has historically enshrined the incomprehensible by compelling men to accept that which is absurd and nonsensical as knowledge of reality.
4. “God acts to his own pleasure.”
   Some Christian defenders may claim that God is capable of pleasure. But pleasure as opposed to what? If God is perfect as they claim, then how can God experience displeasure, disappointment, dejection, or frustration? As soon as the believer makes an attempt to explain away one contradiction (e.g., an immortal being which can value), he entraps himself in another (e.g., a perfect being which can be displeased). [24] More problems result. If God is perfect, how can it be man’s responsibility to please God? If God is perfect, how can the imperfect please or satisfy the imperfect? Indeed, why should the perfect need to be pleased in the first place? Instead of answers, such questions typically bring us evasions. What possible good could any of this accomplish? Blank out.

   Far from producing genuine points of contention which themselves endure scrutiny, such ploys are properly identified as mere evasive tactics. From biblical philosophy’s nonchalance in matters of defining crucial philosophic terms, we can rightly infer nonchalance in crucial philosophic disciplines, particularly in epistemology and morality.

In Conclusion, A Syllogism

The above points can all be generally boiled down to a simple syllogism:

Premise 1: Only rational beings that face the fundamental alternative of existence vs. non-existence can value, love and pursue purpose.

Premise 2: All definitions of the Christian God assert that God is immortal, which means that it does not face this fundamental alternative.

Conclusion: Therefore, God cannot value, love or pursue purpose.

Above we saw that value presupposes a conscious entity which faces the fundamental alternative between existence and non-existence, and that love is this conscious entity’s emotional response to those values which make its life possible and enjoyable. We also saw that purpose can only apply to those conscious beings which face fundamental alternatives and which are capable of acting on behalf of achieving and/or maintaining one over the other. In light of this, we see that neither of these concepts, ‘value’, ‘love’ or ‘purpose’, can be asserted apart from this fundamental alternative, since all three genetically presuppose this alternative. Consequently, the religious assertion of an immortal and eternal being which can value, love and pursue purpose commits the fallacy of the stolen concept.

If one’s assertions are founded upon stolen concepts, those assertions are consequentially invalid. The idea of the Christian God asserts concepts while denying their genetic roots. Therefore, the idea of the Christian God is invalid. Such a being cannot exist.

Notes

[1] Ironically, these facts more than justify the religionists’ assertion that ‘God is incomprehensible’ for they maintain that God is living, yet it knows not death itself. However, if this be the case, how then can the religionist claim to know that ‘God is eternal and immortal?’ Of course, the religionist will claim that this ‘knowledge’ was revealed to the believer through ‘divinely inspired’ scripture, which only begs the question.

[2] See Lev. 27:8 (x2), 12; Job 13:4; Matt. 10:31; 27:9; Luke 12:7.

[3] See Lev. 27:16; Job 28:16, 19; Matt. 27:9.

[4] See Lev. 27:12.

[5] Merrill Unger, ed., Chicago: The Moody Press, 1988; 1392 pages.

[6] “Playboy’s Interview with Ayn Rand,” pamphlet, 7.

[7] Ayn Rand, “Art and Cognition,” The Romantic Manifesto, p. 77.

[8] Rand, Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, p. 63, italics in original.

[9] Ayn Rand, For the New Intellectual, (New York: Signet, 1961), p. 121; Atlas Shrugged, 931.

[10] Life as the Standard of Value.

[11] Ayn Rand, “The Objectivist Ethics, The Virtue of Selfishness, (New York: Signet, 1964), p. 13. I have tried to find a concise definition of ‘morality’ in the Bible on many occasions, and have been disappointed in every instance. Indeed, my concordance does not even contain an entry for the word ‘morality’, suggesting strongly to me that the Bible nowhere defines this crucial concept. Yet its defenders pose as champions of morality in every area of life, as if their religious doctrines were authoritative on the matter. Morality consists of obedience to God, they will say. But this does not answer any of man’s practical needs, such as the role of values or why man should even choose to be moral in the first place. It is my conviction that such intellectual default as this sufficiently incriminates Christianity as a worldview.

[12] Rand, “The Objectivist Ethics,” The Virtue of Selfishness, p. 15.

[13] Rand, “Concepts of Consciousness,” Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, p. 34.

[14] I have commonly heard people refer to such circumstances as an instance of sacrifice. For instance, a fellow who spent the last two months taking courses after working hours might call the time he spent in those classes a “sacrifice.” But this may or may not be the case, and ultimately depends on what that person values more, whether or not his time spent in the evening classes is really a sacrifice. “Sacrifice is the surrender of a higher value for the sake of a lesser one or a nonvalue (Ayn Rand, “The Ethics of Emergencies,” The Virtue of Selfishness, p. 44). If this person valued his evenings in front of a television more than he valued the education he was seeking and the values that education promises to make possible to him, then taking the courses would constitute a sacrifice for this individual, because the evenings in classes are taken at the expense of what he values more, which is an evening in front of the television. If, on the other hand, he valued his education and the values it promises to make possible to him in the future more than he values an evening of television, then taking the courses would not constitute a sacrifice, because he would not be pursuing a lesser value at the expense of a greater value. For a rational man, such investment is not a sacrifice.

[15] “Productiveness as the Adjustment of Nature to Man,” Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand, p. 298.

[16] Objectivists hold that their fundamental purpose in life is to live and to enjoy their lives. This is a purpose which one accepts by choice. Objectivists do not regard obedience to the will of others, be they men or alleged supernatural beings, as such to qualify as a legitimately moral purpose. To what end should one obey the will of others? Whose ends are to benefit from action resulting from such obedience? Why should one consider those ends important? Important to whom? Etc. Questions like these are never adequately answered by altruistic or pietistic systems of morality. Indeed, even these views cannot entirely escape man’s fundamentally selfish nature, even though they condemn his selfishness as his primary failing and consequently deem him immoral, depraved or even evil as such. The contradiction between Christian ethics and its condemnation of man’s selfishness, as we saw in Unger’s above, is clearly demonstrated when one asks Christians why one should obey Christian moral doctrine. “So you can please God,” they will say. Why should one want to please God? “So that you will escape torment and enjoy eternal joy and peace,” they will ultimately admit. Even though these goals are arbitrary, eternal joy and peace as the ultimate goals of Christian morality presuppose the satisfaction of personal ambition as the primary motivation for the Christian view of morality. Yet the satisfaction of personal ambition itself is condemned when they condemn man’s selfishness as the primary root of his evil.

[17] For the New Intellectual, 121; Atlas Shrugged, 931.

[18] Viable Values: A Study of Life as the Root and Reward of Morality, Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000), p. 85.

[19] Ibid., 118n.

[20] “The Objectivist Ethics,” The Virtue of Selfishness, 16.

[21] Viable Values, pp. 87-88, 89.

[22] Footnote: The intrinsic theory of values

holds that the good is inherent in certain things or actions as such, regardless of their context and consequences, regardless of any benefit or injury they may cause to the actors and subjects involved. It is a theory which divorces the concept ‘good’ from beneficiaries, and the concept of ‘value’ from valuer and purpose – claiming that the good is good in, by, and of itself. (Ayn Rand, “What is Capitalism?” Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal, (New York: Signet, 1967), p. 21.)

See also Leonard Peikoff’s Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand, (New York: Meridian, 1991), pp. 245-248.

[23] Eventually I will be publishing my own critical analyses of presuppositionalism on my website. See also some critical arguments against presuppositionalism already published on the Secular Web.

[24] See also Smith, Viable Values, pp. 87-90.

A Perfect Being?

Most religions, especially western religions, regard their god to be perfect, i.e., whole, entire and without flaw or error, indeed incapable of any fallibility whatsoever. This characteristic is normally asserted without a lot of reasoning as to why that must be so (apart from any reasoning as to why one should accept the claim that a god exists to begin with), but is endorsed virtually unanimously by the church (particularly in the case of Christianity).

But the deeper questions that the attribution of perfection to god evokes usually go unanswered, possibly because they go unasked. What does it mean for a being to be perfect? What would be the expected consequences of a being that can be said to be perfect? How does the attribute ‘perfection’ integrate with other attributes claimed to be possessed by God, such as purpose, omnipotence and omniscience? Or, does integration of these concepts even matter when it comes to defining such a being as God?

God, according to western traditions, is said to be the creator of the universe. As a creator, and as a perfect creator, would it not be expected that perfection follows from perfection? If god has all these absolute superlative traits – omniscience, omnipotence, omnibenevolence, etc., would it not be corollary that whatever proceeds from this perfect being would also be perfect itself?

Perfection vs. purpose:

One of the most neglected questions in regard to religious attributions to the notion god is the matter of purpose. Christians are notorious for their constant bleating about God’s plan, or purpose. Just what this purpose is, and how the concept purpose can be legitimately integrated with the notion of an immortal, perfect being, is a mystery. Many theologians have thrown up their hands in confession to their inability to harmonize this conundrum, yet instead of questioning its validity, proceed to insist that men accept it as knowledge anyhow.

When the question of purpose is measured against the attribute perfection, however, the degree of this dilemma is amplified to its fullest extent. For generally the same reasons that the concept purpose cannot be integrated with immortality, there are serious and insurmountable problems which the apologist faces when trying to ascribe purposefulness to a perfect being. Perfection entails entirety, wholeness, the absence of lack, completeness in every sense, in every context, at all times. A perfect being is free of any privation whatsoever, and therefore lacks nothing, and, consequently, wants and needs nothing. Without need or desire, there can be no purpose. Without an appetite, whether for sustenance or for pleasure, for instance, a man has no need to eat, and therefore, eating at that time would serve no purpose. A perfect being does not have all its needs already satisfied; on the contrary, by definition, a perfect being would have no needs whatsoever to satisfy.

Christians may argue that God’s purpose is to create. However, this argument does not explain anything, but merely postpones resolving the essential problem. Why would a perfect being create anything? We already recognize that a perfect being cannot suffer need of any nature whatsoever, so to posit creation as the purpose of a perfect being is unjustified. Insofar as God, an allegedly perfect being, would be concerned, any creative activity in which it might engage itself must necessarily be without purpose, arbitrary, in a word, pointless. However, many Christians might counter that God creates for his pleasure, which infers that the satisfaction of God’s pleasure is his ultimate purpose. But this position would necessarily imply that God can enjoy pleasure, but, since he must create in order to enjoy that pleasure, that he is not perpetually satisfied, as he must act in order to make that pleasure a reality. In other words, any assertion entailing that God’s ultimate purpose is the satisfaction of his pleasure, and that God indeed acts to experience pleasure (e.g., the creation of the universe), strongly suggests that God responds to stimulus, can experience the opposite of pleasure, which is pain, and that God indeed needs pleasure. If God must act in order to enjoy pleasure, would that not mean that it would be his displeasure should he refrain from action, creative or otherwise?

Certainly there are many problems that arise when trying to reconcile the notion of a perfect being exercising any kind of purpose. While purpose presupposes an end which is yet to be achieved or to continually be achieved, an end that is either vital to the being in question, or desired by an act of volition (in the case of man), perfection strongly suggests a finality to all purpose, an end in itself. A perfect being would be a being whose ends have either already been achieved and fulfilled, or, as the case may be, a being which has never suffered need or want and therefore has never required either the pursuit or satisfaction of an end. Yet, in spite of all this, the theist maintains that his deity indeed has a purpose and that purpose is in the process of being fulfilled on a daily basis throughout the universe, and throughout the lives of human beings. We are told that this purpose is of God’s design, just as the universe is said to be God’s creation. But the assertion that a purpose or plan is in the process of being fulfilled infers that the end goal of that purpose is yet to be achieved, which is a state of imperfection, not perfection.

A Perfect Being creating Imperfection?

It is an undeniable fact that the universe is full of motion. Throughout the cosmos stars are birthing and exploding, asteroids are colliding and being pulverized, comets are disintegrating. Even on earth where there is a life supporting atmosphere, natural catastrophes are constantly reshaping the environment, ecosystems are forming and expiring, animal species are evolving and going extinct. The universe is virtually alive with self-correcting action, ever held in check by the balance of natural laws. Do these characteristics describe a perfect existence? Does this sound like a creation of a perfect being?

Essentially, the question to the theist becomes: How does imperfection arise from perfection? While it can be easily demonstrated that perfection can in fact arise from imperfection (a student achieving an A+ on a high school test should serve as adequate evidence for this), it remains to be explained how something claimed to be perfect can create something that is not perfect. If perfection is the starting point, as would be the case in theistic doctrines, especially if that state of perfection were armed with omnipotence (as Christians claim of their God), one would expect that any creative attempt that arose from that state of perfection would necessarily and unequivocally result in more perfection. Yet, the facts of reality do not support this causal chain of perpetual perfection in the least, and apologists and theologians can only grasp at additional absurdities in order to harmonize these facts with their extraordinary claims.

While the universe does offer living beings like man a suitable place for his existence, there are definitely many places quite hostile to his organism, indeed within even his own environment.

How does God’s alleged perfection conflict with his other alleged characteristics? God is said to be omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent. Can perfection be harmonized with each of these characteristics without incongruity?

Perfection and Omniscience?

A perfect God is said also to be omniscient by Christians. However, it is hard to see what purpose omniscience would serve for a perfect being. As already discussed, a perfect being would have need of nothing, or want of nothing. The concepts ‘need’ and ‘want’ are completely inapplicable in the case of a perfect being. So the question becomes, with respect to omniscience: why would God – a perfect being – have knowledge? Certainly, this knowledge could serve no purpose for God, since God as a perfect being would have no need for a purpose, and therefore no purpose to fulfill. So, such knowledge, even ‘omniscience’ or knowledge without method, cannot be necessary to God, since knowledge presupposes purpose, need and, indeed, imperfection. But the Christian insists that God possesses all knowledge, that God is omniscient, in fact, that God is necessarily omniscient. However, what purpose a perfect being could have for knowledge, complete or not, is not stated. This incoherence is further magnified by the claim that God would not be perfect unless he were also omniscient. Indeed, how could a perfect being be complete without complete knowledge? Herein lies the unresolvable paradox for the theist: A perfect being has no need to satisfy, and therefore has no need for knowledge, complete or otherwise, yet a perfect being cannot be said to be complete – and therefore perfect – without complete knowledge. By now, the arbitrary nature of the notion ‘god’ should be clear. This is why the priests insist that lay members accept their claims unquestioningly, for once a little critical thought is applied to their assertions, their arbitrary nature is easily discovered. The commandment “Believe, or go to hell,” is nothing more than an attempt to intimidate any man who would dare use his own mind.

Certainly these and many other questions would have to be addressed if the theologians of the world intend to offer a coherent idea of their alleged deity.

An Unchanging God?

A Pointed Anecdote

Christians believe that (a) their God is “unchanging.” They also believe that (b) their God is jealous, as mentioned explicitly in Exodus 20:5, and that (c) their God is also full of wrath and anger (numerous citations can be found in the Bible which support this).

If the Christian believes (a), (b) and (c) above, then according to them their God must always be jealous, angry and wrathful. (i.e., God must be pretty miserable.)

Some Christians may attempt to apologize their way out of this gloomy characterization of their God, but given (a), traits (b) and (c) must hold forever, since (a) states that God does not change. A jealous being that does not change is jealous so long as that being exists. The same can be said about God’s alleged wrath and anger. Of course, believers will say this is taken out of context, or make some other shoddy attempt to contend this, but such action would only betray the believer’s discomfort with this realization.

Now, what about when the believer gets to heaven? Since God’s nature does not change, and God is both jealous as well as angry and wrathful, what will God do with these unquenchable characteristics, jealousy, wrath and anger? Since all the sinners have already been damned to hell for eternity, and there can be no suffering greater than hell, God will necessarily need to find new objects for his vicious character traits.

Given this situation, what does the believer think will keep God from taking out his anger and wrath on the newcomers to his heavenly kingdom? After all, there’s plenty for God to be jealous about. For if believers make it to heaven through no effort of their own, then those who make it to heaven enjoy the unearned. And God in his eternal misery would no doubt become extremely jealous over the believers’ free ride – given that he must find an object to his vices. Consequently, he would likely take out his wrath and anger against those whom he had just welcomed to his paradise.

But then what will happen after God has exhausted his entire supply of saints in heaven, having sent them all to hell in his jealous, angry rages, and there’s no one left on whom to take out his fits? His jealousy, anger and rage are essentially co-eternal with God, since his character never changes, so he will never be able to escape his own misery. Apologists in clarifying God’s “omnipotence” claim that God cannot contradict his nature. That’s fine. But that means that he cannot simply wish his anger and jealousy away, for this would contradict his own character.

Would God just create more saints and sinners to destroy in his unrelenting rage? Why should he do this? He already knows the outcome, since he’s omniscience, and since he’s omniscience, he must recognize that his jealousy, wrath and anger will never go away, since God cannot change. This knowledge will likely compound God’s misery.

What is left for God to do? Certainly, any human being in this predicament would ultimately kill himself. But can God self-annihilate? This, apologists would say, would contradict his nature, and this God cannot do, they’d claim. Notwithstanding, God could learn from unquenchably miserable men and decide that suicide is the best option, and he’d only have to do it once, if he were successful. He could, after all, create a kind of cosmic Jack Kevorkian to help him do the deed (though he would probably be tempted to destroy this cosmic Jack Kevorkian before his suicide could be fully assisted to termination, since this Jack Kevorkian would be yet another object for God’s jealous rages; God would have to be extra careful not to let this happen).

Barring this, if God could not self-terminate, he would end up spending eternity in an unending, crescendoing misery, a misery which knows no end, and offers no relief. By the mystic’s own descriptions of God, which are intended to protect God from the critical scrutiny of non-believers and skeptics, the mystic has created a God who is already in the hell of its own making, a hell that never forgives, that never gives up its prisoners.

Such is the end of a jealous God.

Biblical References:
(a) – (See Mal 3:6, Ps. 119:89, Ec. 3:14, Heb. 6:17, Jas. 1:17)
(b) – (See Exodus 20:5)
(c) – (Too numerous to list)

On Transcendental Argument For The Existence Of God

We often find scenarios such as this:

• Atheist: I have no god-belief
• Theist: Okay, why is that?
• Atheist: Well, for one thing, you cannot prove that God exists.
• Theist: Certainly I can.
• Atheist: Okay, prove God exists.
• Theist: Okay. Do you believe that the laws of logic exist?
• Atheist: Sure I do. I do not think that is in dispute.
• Theist: It may not be in dispute, but I hold that your atheism cannot account for the existence of the laws of logic.

Stop right there. For one thing, the assumption that atheism as such should be held responsible for accounting for facts is fallacious. The claim that “Atheism is inadequate to explain the very reasoning processes we use to discuss the existence of God” commits the fallacy known as allegation of the neglected onus. Atheism is the absence of god-belief, and is not a positive, but a negative – “which leaves wide open what you do believe in.” [Footnote: Leonard Peikoff, "Religion Versus America," The Objectivist Forum, June, 1986, p. 14.] In other words, atheism as such is not a worldview, nor does it inform a worldview. This fact is only confirmed by the fact that there are many non-theistic philosophies which differ radically (i.e., fundamentally) from each other (such as Objectivism vs. Communism, etc.). Failure to recognize this results from the failure to recognize crucial distinctions of essential nature (such as the advocacy of the morality of rational self-interest in the case of Objectivism vis-à-vis that of altruism in Communism). Insistence on rejecting these distinctions results in a package-deal, which is a conceptual fallacy.

Going back to the debate above; And more importantly, the atheist challenged the theist to prove that God exists. After all, that is the theist’s claim, is it not? If this is what the theist claims, then he has the burden of proof to support this claim. The claim that God exists is existentially positive in nature: It asserts a positive statement about existence. Therefore, we are justified in expecting the theist to offer a positive course of argument to meet the end he is challenged to meet. The theist, in typical presuppositionalist stride, attempts immediately to shed his onus of proof, like a snake shedding his dead skin, and to turn the tables on the atheist: he now wants the atheist to contribute a positive argument for something that is apparently not in dispute between either party, and which is unproductive to the end of meeting the end which the theist is challenged to meet.

This route of debate is profoundly disingenuous. What relevance does one atheist’s ignorance of the proper foundations of the laws of logic have to do with the establishment of an existentially positive claim? It does not follow from Mr. A’s ignorance of X that Mr. B’s assertion that Y exists is true. Even if Mr. B wants to propose a relationship between X and Y (in this case, between the laws of logic and the existence of God), Mr. B still bears the prior onus of demonstrating his claim that Y exists. Only then, after he has settle this matter in question, can he then proceed to pontificate on his claim that some relationship exists between X and Y. This kind of tactic merely attempts

It is the attempt to persuade without putting forth a legitimate proof. This is the baiting nature of presuppositionalism, for it attempts to goad non-believers into accepting the believer’s questionable premises by ceasing on something which the non-believer does accept, but for which the non-believer may or may not have a ready explanation. The non-believer’s lack of a ready explanation, however, does not prove the believer’s questionable premises by any stretch. In this very sense, the transcendental argument for the existence of God, and presuppositionalism in general, are merely intricate arguments from ignorance.

The certainty of the claim that God exists, notwithstanding the incoherence of the attributes ascribed to it, does not and cannot follow from one’s ignorance of another matter.

Christian apologists claim that ” that without any foundational or overarching (transcendental) source, truth, morality, value, and meaning cannot be absolute but only relative (to oneself, one’s culture, a historical epoch, an evolutionary stage, etc.).” But how do they establish this? As an Objectivist, I do not object to the call to clarify one’s foundations. Indeed, there is nothing so crucially important to the validity of a worldview. As I see it, one has three basic alternatives when it comes to defining one’s foundations, one which is valid, the other two being invalid:

1. Existence – as Objectivism holds (“existence exsits”)
2. Non-existence – and this would be absurd, because existence exists
3. Consciousness – because philosophers want to start with a zero (non-existence) but still need to explain 1. above.

The theist refuses to start with the universe as his foundation. He gives many different reasons for this, but all these reasons are disabled by dubious assumptions. Essentially, this means he does not want to begin with the fact of existence as such. If he were willing to begin with the fact of existence as his irreducible foundation, he should have no problem embracing Objectivism fully.

The fact that many philosophers wish to begin with non-existence is evident in their theories about “space,” and in arguments such as the “first cause” argument, which posits a beginning to the universe (i.e., of existence as such). “The universe had to come from somewhere,” they chatter, remaining blind to the fact that “somewhere” implies the existence of the universe already. ‘Universe’ is the sum total of existence; if something exists, it is by definition a member of the universe. There are no existents which exist “outside” the universe. There is no “outside” the universe. To posit the need to explain the alleged beginning of the universe is to imply that one must start with the zero of “nothingness.”

But the universe indisputably exists, because existence exists. And the theist now has a problem: how does he get from the non-existence with which he implicitly wants to begin (and, incidentally, to which he wants to return), to the fact that existence does exist? How does he get from the vacuum of nothing to the plenum [Footnote: By 'plenum' I mean "an assembly attended by all members" (Webster's II New Riverside Dictionary, s.v., 'plenum'.] of the universe? Here he needs causality: the universe is the result of a prior cause. But to posit causality, he needs an agent which does the causing. One cannot posit a cause without also positing something that does the causing, just as one cannot have a dance without a dancer. And this is where we get to the notion of a God: a form of consciousness which is the source of all existence. Thus, for the theist, consciousness holds primacy over existence. This is the doctrine of metaphysical subjectivism, which assumes the validity of the primacy of consciousness, which Objectivism shows to be false.

Therefore, the claim that one needs a “transcendent” (i.e., beyond existence) principle as the foundation to logic, reasoning, cognition, conceptual thought, intelligibility, or what have you, is built on false premises, and should be rejected.

Fake Miracles

I’ve heard of couples claiming to have had miracle babies. The narration of the so-called divine miracle often goes like this:

Our first baby (was very sick after birth/a miscarriage/stillborn/died after birth). Doctors said we could not have any more babies. So we prayed to Jesus and he gave us another baby(s).

On closer examination, one would find that the mother had a Rhesus negative blood type, the Dad had a rhesus positive blood type, the first baby suffered from Erythroblastosis fetalis and the second baby was given Rho(D) Immune Globulin for its survival & health.

This is a classic case of faith taking all the credit for what science did.

Why do couples do it? Possible reasons include:

1. To earn brownie points in the religious community. What more do you need than to show to your community that you are so pious/virtuous that you were capable of winning favors from none less than God himself?!
2. To hide a secretly done Therapeutic abortion. The couple might have chosen to abort the fetus to save the life of the mother. But that would be considered evil by their religious community. So to mask that you would have to pretend that the second baby & what happened to the first was endorsed by God.

Source: My molecular genetics lectures at NUS.

Ravi Lies For Jesus Again

Here is a video analysis of yet another lie by Ravi: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vyd6om8IC4M

In the video, Ravi narrates how he bested an atheist student in a debate. But the only problem is, in one narration this “fictional” debate takes place at Harvard. And in another narration the same “fictional” debate took place at University of Nottingham.