Archive

Archive for January, 2006

Indian’s Dilemma – Part 3

January 25, 2006 edwinhere 8 comments

(Most of the content here on game theory is a direct copy-paste from wikipedia)

This may be one of the most difficult posts I made till now; not because I did’nt have any ideas, but because I find it incredibly difficult to express my thoughts in words; after all a man of few words is what I am.

In the last post I said Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma ( IPD ) problem could explain many ( if not all ) of the reasons why we never played it right. In this post I will quickly narrate an example IPD type situation involving 4 agents: 2 are from India, and the other 2 from Weasel Land ( where they are really good at IPD games).

Assume that each player faces the other 3 in a match lasting 6 games. If one player gives evidence against a player who does not, the former gains 5 points and the latter nets zero. If both refrain from giving evidence, both gain 3 points. If both give evidence against each other, both gain 1 point.

When a weasel faces off against an Indian, the former refrains from giving evidence in the first game while the Indian does the opposite, gaining the Indian 5 points. In the remaining 5 games, both players give evidence against each other, netting 1 point each game. The final score is Indian, 10; Weasel, 5.

When Weasels face off against each other, each refrains from giving evidence in all 6 games. 6 x 3= 18 points for each Weasel.

When Indians face off, each gives evidence against the other in all 6 games. 6 x 1 = 6 points for both Indians.

The final score for each Weasel is 5 + 5 + 18 = 28 points. The final score for each Indian is 10 + 10 + 6 = 26 points. Despite the fact that the Weasels never won a match and Indians never lost a match, the Weasels still came out ahead, because the final score is not determined by the winner of matches, but the scorer of points. Simply put, the Weasels gained more points tying with each other than they lost to the Indians.

I hope you can see what I am trying to tell here: Envy, is the root of many problems we experience in our economy. Most of the games we play in our lives are not like chess ( which by the way is something Indians are really good at) ….that is, it is not necessary that whenever one person wins, other necessarily loses. In other words, the goal of most of the games in life is to maximize profits, NOT to profit more than your opponent.

To summarize, the reasons why India never played it right are:

  1. Absence of “unenforced cooperation” ( cooperation that is evolved from extreme competition )
  2. Involuntary Magical Thinking
Categories: economics, india

Indian’s Dilemma – Part 2

January 19, 2006 edwinhere Leave a comment

(Most of the content here on game theory is a direct copy-paste from wikipedia)

The problem in the last post can be summarized as follows: “Will the two prisoners cooperate to minimize total loss of liberty or will one of them, trusting the other to cooperate, betray him so as to go free?”

The unique equilibrium for this game does not lead to a Pareto-optimal solution. That is, when two rational players both play defect even though the total reward (the sum of the reward received by the two players) would be greater if they both played cooperate. In equilibrium, each prisoner chooses to defect even though both would be better off by cooperating. This is the dilemma.

So much for Prisoners Dilemma…Now the Indian Situation….
Though the world calls us Indians illiterate and poor, I bet all of us fare much better in simple strategic situations in life. In other words we are “mostly” rational. (I say “mostly” because we are also driven by a good amount of Magical Thinking)

Now PD shows that when 2 rational entities try to maximize profits they tend to make decisions that worsen the situation as a group. This phenomenon is inevitable and will occur in every economy.

Some of the reasons why India has been a loser can be found in the next level of the problem: Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma

In the iterated prisoner’s dilemma the game is played repeatedly. Thus each player has an opportunity to “punish” the other player for previous non-cooperative play. Cooperation may then arise as an equilibrium outcome. The incentive to cheat may then be overcome by the threat of punishment, leading to the possibility of a cooperative outcome. As the number of iterations approaches infinity, the Nash equilibrium tends to the Pareto optimum.

(to be continued…)

Categories: economics, india

Indian’s Dilemma – Part 1

January 19, 2006 edwinhere Leave a comment

I have always wondered why India always misses the right note. Why we never played it right after 50 years. I cannot criticize by telling how other countries did far better in shorter periods. Because my Indian critics always opposes any such statement by telling me that India is much different from every country. In this post, I have some thoughts which can possibly explain what went wrong using a non-relative approach. I used my feeble human intellect, incomplete knowledge of game theory and some stolen thoughts from Amrtya Sen to organize my beliefs.

Some Game Theory before I continue ( from wikipedia )

  • Game theory is a branch of applied mathematics that studies strategic situations where players choose different actions in an attempt to maximize their returns.
  • Given a set of alternative allocations and a set of individuals, a movement from one alternative allocation to another that can make at least one individual better off, without making any other individual worse off is called a Pareto improvement or Pareto optimization. An allocation of resources is Pareto efficient or Pareto optimal when no further Pareto improvements can be made.
  • Nash equilibrium (named after John Nash who proposed it) is a kind of optimal collective strategy in a game involving two or more players, where no player has anything to gain by changing only his or her own strategy. If each player has chosen a strategy and no player can benefit by changing his or her strategy while the other players keep theirs unchanged, then the current set of strategy choices and the corresponding payoffs constitute a Nash equilibrium.

Classical Prisoner’s Dilemma ( from wikipedia )

The classical prisoner’s dilemma (PD) is as follows:

Two suspects, A and B, are arrested by the police. The police have insufficient evidence for a conviction, and having separated both prisoners, visit each of them and offer the same deal: if one testifies for the prosecution (turns Queen’s Evidence) against the other and the other remains silent, the silent accomplice receives the full 10-year sentence and the betrayer goes free. If both stay silent, the police can only give both prisoners 6 months for a minor charge. If both betray each other, they receive a 2-year sentence each. Each prisoner must make a choice – to betray the other, or to remain silent. However, neither prisoner knows for sure what choice the other prisoner will make. What will happen?

(to be continued…)

Categories: economics, india

Ambivalence

January 19, 2006 edwinhere 3 comments

Sometimes I really hate Indians. They want help for free. They demand it, and if they don’t get it, they will hate me and will refuse to cooperate in everything else. Now what happens if I do help them? They cling to me like a leech, sucking out all my time. Now what if ask for help? They hate me for asking a little of their time which they would have spent in leisure. So it is basically, eye for an eye but no help for help.

I hate Indians because of the pseudo-praises they make so as to induce pride, which they believe will lead to my fall. I hate them because of their pseudo-sympathies which they express so as to induce a sense of weakness in me which they believe will keep me under-performing in social life.

Now since when did I become a non-indian to crticize?
I did not. I simply assumed the status of an observer like many Indians who do the same because they believe by being so, they’ll be able to change India.

Everyone knows talking the talk is easier than walking the walk.

Categories: india

Engineering Project Show and Clogged Pipes

January 19, 2006 edwinhere Leave a comment

Today was engineering project show at school. My semi-complete project was selected to be displayed just because it looked cool. Like I said the project is still undergoing development and most of the features were not implemented. Most of the existing features had to be modified to make it look complete.

Back at home, the drainage pipe had been clogged for past one week. Today the landlord sent a plumber to clean it. He came with an ingenious contraption that could bend like an endoscope. After 3 minutes of poking around, he took out the block that clogged the pipe….a can opener!

Categories: my life, nonsense

A Machine

January 3, 2006 edwinhere Leave a comment

What would you do to understand a machine that has much more than an average of 7.0E27 functional parts at its fundamental layer of abstraction(LOA), with hundreds of such functional layers, trillions of processes at each of these LOA, occuring simultaneously at different speeds, with each process at the most fundamental level affecting drastically what happens in that level and every level above it so much so that a slight error in any of these levels may determine whether this machine works or not or functions less efficiently? What if each of these processes are similar to the ones found even in the simplest of its kind, yet the final outcomes and behaviours are a zillion times better?

What if there are no manuals to explain this machine and we would like to know the source of a bizzare and seemingly impossible behaviour like for example: being better than infinite monkeys on infinite type writers? What if we would like to enhance, aggravate or mitigate this behaviour?
What if we would like to do all this but we don’t know all of the above mentioned processes and states of functional parts and most of what we know are non-contributing to the outcome under investigation?

“When does a perceptual schematic become consciousness? When does a difference engine become the search for truth? When does a personality simulation become the bitter mote… of a soul?” — Dr. Alfred Lanning in the movie I, Robot

Categories: nonsense

You’re Hired!

January 2, 2006 edwinhere 1 comment

I am very confused and excited today. I have been offered a job in Temasek Polytechnic(TP). Dr. Yin asked me whether I was interested. I don’t know whether I will get the job but he told me he will ask me again a few months before I graduate. Anyway I told him that I liked the environment in the Polytechnic.

He told me that the Polytechnic wanted candidates who have experienced their projects and completed their National Service or exempted from it. This means among the students who graduate from TP only a few will be eligible. My job duties will include working with development projects that are undertaken at the polytechnic. He also hinted that I will be taken to Philips along with other staff members as a part of my job. Mr. Matti had previously mentioned that TP will sent one of their staff to US next year for a demo.

This event has given me an uplift which I haven’t felt for a long time. I feel like I am better than my peers. Their sarcasm towards my predipositions and peer rejections don’t affect me anymore.

Who knows may be this is just a trick to keep me working hard in my internship this semester. Or may be I will end up in US for a product demo with philips. I don’t mind dwelling on such feel good dreams these days. Because all my life I have been a loser who experienced success just because someone was sympathetic to me. And these dreams where all I had to make me feel better.

So this is what I am going to do: I will assume I got the job with a very high salary, higher than my peers. That will show them who I am and what I am capable of. After all money is really one of the most important things in life, though most of the liars out there tell me no.

Categories: my life