Normative Standard of Ethics

Mr. Apologist wrote: “For judgements like good and evil cannot be subjective, but must proceed from a standard, that by the very nature of ethics is required to fulfill three criteria: the normative standard of ethics must be transcendent, personal, and absolute.“

Here Mr. Apologist identifies three cardinal criteria which a “normative standard of ethics” should fulfill, according to his worldview. We shall examine each in turn. But at this time, we should notice

the following significant omissions: nowhere does he

1. define ‘ethics’ for the record,
2. explain why, if at all, man needs ethics, or
3. explain what ethics is supposed to accomplish for him (if indeed anything).

Without addressing or clarifying these preliminary concerns before he begins to discuss the identity of the proper standard of ethics (or morality), he might as well be “speaking in tongues” which none of his readers can understand. The meaning of his primary terms is taken completely for granted and thus unclear, and consequently any secondary terms he should now discuss float in the air with no philosophical basis, with no tie to reality, no objective reference. This failure to define his terms will only haunt his argument from here forward, in spite of his efforts to posture as an authority in these matters.

Mr. Apologist wrote: “Transcendent and absolute are actually two sides of the same issue: any ethical standard must be ultimate, for if we say that ethical norms proceed from a finite individual (subjectivism) or a group of individuals (conventionalism) the man or culture that has been set up as a standard is capable of corruption.“

Mr. Apologist nowhere defines what he means by ‘transcendent’, nor does he explain what he means by the term in reference to the matter at hand (e.g., what does the thing which is said to be ‘transcendent’ transcend?). Thus, he provides little or no direct context to his assertion that the standard of ethics must be ‘transcendent’ in nature. Furthermore, we do not find this term ‘transcendent’ or any of its cognates defined in the Bible (Strong’s Exhaustive Concordance does not even give an entry for this word, going from ‘tranquility’ to ‘transferred’, giving ‘transcendent’ a complete miss). Thus, the above statement is vague and open to various interpretation, and unfortunately allows for an indefinite latitude of ambiguity amenable to the influence of mystical (i.e., irrational) bias. Given the frailty of indicators for his intended meaning, we cannot rule out the possibility that Mr. Apologist uses the term simply for its sound effect or emotional charge rather than to identify a genuine moral need.

William L. Reese, in his Dictionary of Philosophy and Religion notes the following in regard to the term ‘transcendent’:

From the Latin transcendere meaning “to cross a boundary.” This term, along with its other forms, “transcendental,” “transcendence,” and “transcendentalism,” has been used in a number of ways, and with a number of distinct interpretations, in the history of philosophy.

In his Dictionary, Reese lists eight separate definitions and uses for the term in question. However, I will not try to coordinate from Mr. Apologist’s statements which of Reese’s definitions for ‘transcendent’ he has in mind when he uses the term (since this may only multiply any guesswork on

my part). Instead, I will rely more on the context of Mr. Apologist’s statements (what little there is) in order to draw out what he means. I can only work with this by attempting to provide my own interpretation of what is meant here, though because of its imprecision of thought, my effort to do so may not yield a product of certainty. However, the point of this exercise, which shall thread its way through the next few sections, will be to demonstrate that these criteria, supposing they were by themselves justified, do not warrant the leap to the supernatural or to the notion of a deity unless such notions are built into the criteria implicitly, i.e., only if the supernatural or deity is presupposed and smuggled into the theist’s criteria. With this in mind, let us proceed.

By the term ‘transcendent’, he seems to be wanting to say that an ethical standard must be in some way “beyond” that for which it serves as an ethical standard. In other words, the ethical standard for man must be “beyond” him in some way, specifically, outside his influence to change. If this is what Mr. Apologist means here, I think there is a hint of truth here. This is what appears to be meant by his statement that “Transcendent and absolute are actually two sides of the same issue.” Something that is absolute is not open to man’s revision; it is stable and fixed. Likewise something that is ‘transcendent’ is beyond man’s influence to change. But I am not convinced that my translation of Mr. Apologist’s statement here (primarily because of its insufficiencies) is very accurate because at this point the two terms seem redundant. If we posit something that is absolute, what new legitimate information or stipulation are we given by describing what is absolute as also ‘transcendent’? Something that is absolute is equally “beyond” man’s influence to change as well, so what need is there for this term ‘transcendent’, which at this point seems problematic, and even suspicious? Mr. Apologist, of course, does not elaborate.

If the ‘boundary’ to be crossed is assumed to be that delimiting reality, thus pointing to a standard “outside reality” (i.e., non-reality), we are justified in rejecting Mr. Apologist’s criterion ‘transcendent’ from the very beginning of our inquiry. The non-real has no application to the real, and the standard of real values does not find its source in the non-real. If Mr. Apologist & co. want to say that their standard of ethics is genuinely real (i.e., that it actually exists), why the need to ‘transcend’ reality? Such supposed criteria, from an objective point of view, can only be considered as a gateway to the arbitrary.

However, assuming any accuracy to my interpretation, this approach to moral norms appears to be built on a logical reversal. What appears to be happening is that the ethical standard is being described after the ethical system itself has been framed and developed rather than first asking what an ethical system is, what it should accomplish, and why, if at all, anyone needs it. (See my points above.) Mr. Apologist’s preferred course is not a rational (i.e., scientific) approach to the subject of ethics, but a means of rationalizing a system of ethics which one has accepted without first addressing these important questions. His aim here, so it appears, is to give the primitive nature of religious confessional investments an air of modern credibility.

By a rational or scientific means of approaching the issue of ethics, we should be willing at minimum to address questions such as the following:

1. What is ethics or morality? (I use the two terms at this point interchangeably; since Mr. Apologist does not define either or distinguish the two, I see no reason why he would object to this.)
2. Does man need ethics (or morality)?
3. If it is the case that man does need ethics (or morality), then we have three principal questions:a. Why does he need ethics? b. If man does need ethics, what gives rise to this need, and what is its nature? c. Does that which gives rise to man’s need for ethics change, or can it change? (I.e., is that which gives rise to man’s need for ethics open to his influence to change? Is it absolute?)

Religious ethics in general, and Mr. Apologist’s considerations of ethics in particular, do not proceed according to this course of inquiry, an approach which seeks to discover and identify man’s needs based on evidences in reality. Instead, religious ethical teachings reverse this approach, preferring one which begins with non-negotiable, predetermined conceptions of what constitutes the practical expression of ethics (namely self-sacrifice compelled by unargued commandments), and then rationalizing why ethical standards might be needed by man and inferring from these presuppositions what supposedly constitutes those standards. Then, after all this, some definition of ethics may be provided, but one which must be retrofitted to accommodate preconceived notions of right and wrong. Theists who intend to defend their religious programs against the criticisms of non-believers should take note: “Definitions are the guardians of rationality, the first line of defense against the chaos of mental disintegration.” Instead of discovering what are man’s objective moral needs and identifying a code of values which conforms to his meeting those needs, man is to be conformed – by force, if necessary – to ethical norms which do not stem from his objective moral needs, and thus meeting those needs is at best taken for granted or simply deemed irrelevant to his moral nature and conduct. This is worse than simply a sloppy approach to the issue of ethics, an issue far too important to man to be left to the hazards such evasions and omissions can only produce; it is a view of morality which, if taken seriously and applied consistently, dramatically undercuts man’s potential to live and enjoy his life on rational terms.

The Bible, to my knowledge, nowhere defines the concepts ‘ethics’ or ‘morality’. Indeed, my concordance does not even have entries for these two crucial concepts. This failure to define crucial terms suggests two things,

1. that the ancients who wrote the books of the Bible did not approach the issue of man’s need for ethics as if it were a genuine philosophical need (which is perhaps due to the facts that philosophy at this point in time was primitive and unscientific and bound by theological commitments, and that the ancients who authored the books of the Bible did not have a very developed concept of rationality and consequently did not have a very developed code of applying rationality to the problems of man’s life), and
2. that we must infer from the statements contained in those books what constitutes the view of ethics which those ancients may have had in mind.

Because of this latter point, that we must infer an ethical code from the primitive writings of the Bible, theologians will constantly be at risk of interpolating modern definitions, views and prejudices into their inferences, thus shaping their resulting conclusions, definitions and doctrines according to the image of ethics they already have in mind. The passages in the Bible which offer moral tenets or inferential cues (e.g., direct commandments, maxims, parables, etc.) are not only often ambiguous, they are also often couched in poetic imagery which may be taken literally or figuratively by particular theologians and commentators, allowing their own biases more sway than may initially be perceived. This is one reason why there are not only numerous incompatible interpretations on the meaning of various passages among Christians, but also why Christianity as a whole is splintered into dozens of rival denominations, sects and conferences. In addition to this, theologians are at risk of assuming at the outset of such an enterprise that the ethical inferences which they derive from the books of the Bible can integrate all the many precepts, injunctions, and illustrations of ethical principles contained therein into a consistent, non-contradictory whole.

If such a consistent integration of ideas is presupposed by theologians at the outset of coordinating into a systematic whole, a set of genetically unrelated maxims, injunctions, and inferences, all of which are assembled together in what amounts to popular vote among an elite group of priests, a process which seems wildly presumptuous (particularly because of the many different authors contributing to the books of the Bible, the great span of time in which they were composed, edited, redacted and assembled – on the verge of 1500 years! – and thee broad-ranging circumstances from which these inferences must be derived), it is difficult to see how the assemblage produced by such an effort can be objective and suitable for man. This resembles more of a cut-and-paste approach to philosophy than an effort of reason. Man’s needs are certainly not the fundamental concern in such a task, but preserving a confessional investment which is unfit for man. And this they call morality!

I submit that it is because of the astounding enormity of such a task as the attempt to derive an integrated, systematic and non-contradictory code of ethics from the murky writings contained in the Bible, that Mr. Apologist and others like him are so typically silent when it comes to defining their views on ethics in terms of essentials. The bases of their principles are not the facts of reality which we discover objectively, but arbitrary, predetermined conclusions guided by confessional commitments which are not open to negotiation. The result cannot be objective, for the facts of reality do not provide the standard, nor will they magically rearrange themselves in order to become irrelevant to man’s life needs. The result can only be arbitrary, for the standard amounts to nothing more than the religious precommitments of whichever theologian is assembling these inferences and calling them a consistent whole.

Mr. Apologist wrote: “The normative standard must be higher than any human institution, because human institutions are all capable of corruption.”

The explicit meaning of such statements is that the standard of a proper moral code is absolute and not subject to revision by whim. The implicit meaning, however, is that that standard should be something other than man, something which man must serve.

Mr. Apologist’s chief concern here appears to be identifying a system of morality whose standard successfully averts the threat of corruption, either from inside or outside the system. If it is true that “human institutions are all capable of corruption,” this is nowhere more explicit than in the case of churches, which are human institutions whose aim is to interpret and filter the teachings of the Bible.

The assumption implicit in Mr. Apologist’s positions, however, is that, since man should not (for whatever reason) be allowed to think for himself and use his capacity to reason in order to determine what his values are and what is the proper course of action needed to achieve and protect those values, man must be controlled by commandments and injunctions which enslave his life to an existence of self-denial, self-sacrifice, and self-immolation. Faith, not reason, is to be man’s moral guide. In other words, man’s entire life is to be governed by his mystical beliefs in the supernatural (“Do as I say, not as I do,” saith the Lord thy God) rather than by the facts of reality. This ignores the fact that man’s moral choices and actions are goal-oriented (i.e., values-oriented) and that his goal-oriented choices and actions must be based on reason, not faith, if those choices and actions are to have any value and meaning to his life.

Mr. Apologist wrote: “Further, the standard must be personal — it is inconceivable that ethical standards could proceed from an impersonal source — an inanimate object could not possibly provide a standard against which the volitional choices of moral agents can be judged.“

This is a blatant argument from ignorance, or worse, a blind appeal to emotion. Neither ignorance nor emotions can substitute for reason, even if that ignorance is the form of a believer’s worship of the supernatural, or if his emotions are the result of irrational fears stimulated by an over-reacting imagination. Mr. Apologist gives no argument for his assertions here, even though one may be

available. This man mistakes himself for Jesus, who uttered moral tenets bereft of reason.

Now that we have reviewed them, let’s suppose we accept Mr. Apologist’s three criteria, which a proper ethical standard should purportedly fulfill, as valid, and ask why they necessitate a theistic basis, as he obviously assumes. It is not at all clear why one would need to posit a theistic standard, unless of course Mr. Apologist’s use of terms like ‘transcendental’ are to be understood to have chiefly theistic references already built into them. However, if we do not assume this, but instead assume the essential interpretation I derive from the context of his statements above, it would not take much to see that they do not necessarily point to a theistic basis, but may in fact be construed as compatible with non-theistic presumptions.

Below I show how each of Mr. Apologist’s criteria can be shown to point to an ethical standard which is compatible with non-belief:

‘Transcendent’: Since the fact that man must meet certain needs in order to live is beyond his control (e.g., man cannot change the fact that he needs food, water and shelter), we could say that man’s life as his standard of ethical value is ‘transcendent’ in the sense that such a standard ‘transcends’ man’s ability to influence or revise. Thus, in man’s life as such, which is natural, we have a moral standard that is ‘transcendent’.

‘Absolute’: The very fact that man’s life requires that he meet certain needs through goal-oriented

action guided by a system of thought which identifies and integrates the facts of reality (i.e., by reason), a fact which can be called ‘transcendent’, is also an absolute fact (as Mr. Apologist himself stated: “Transcendent and absolute are actually two sides of the same issue…”). It is an absolute fact, for instance, that man is an organism and lives by consuming other organisms for nutrients. This fact is not negotiable, it cannot be changed. Man’s life has objective needs and consequently, in order to live, he must recognize those his objective values and govern his choices and actions accordingly. Thus, in man’s life as such we have a moral standard that is ‘absolute’.

‘Personal’: Since man is a person, his life is also therefore personal, since it has everything to do with man’s person. One’s own needs, for instance, are his personal business. Thus, in man’s life as such we have a moral standard that is ‘personal’.

Neither of Mr. Apologist’s own criteria necessitate a jump beyond reality to a ’super-reality’ or some realm which one can never know or discover, but must accept by virtue of the fact that mystics claim it exists. Neither of his criteria necessitate the assumption or assertion of supernaturalism in order to explain or “account for.” Man’s life is a natural phenomenon, not the product of supernatural musing.

Furthermore, when we attempt to integrate Mr. Apologist’s criteria for a moral standard with the teachings of the Bible, we find that those teachings are ‘transcendent’ in the sense that they ‘transcend’ rationality and comprehensibility, and therefore cannot be said to be either rational or comprehensible. We also find that the Bible as a standard for ethics is ‘absolute’ in the sense that it is absolute nonsense, and therefore cannot be said to be either rational or comprehensible. And finally, when we look at the Bible and consider it for the role of providing an ethical standard for man’s life, we find that it is completely impersonal, for it spares no means in attacking man, his reason and his ability to value himself.

Make no mistake: my reinvestment of Mr. Apologist’s three criteria with applications which more or less keep them anchored to objective reality, is not offered in lieu of better reasons for recognizing the fact that man’s own life is the objective basis and standard of his values, and therefore of morality as such. Arguments for this position have been offered by Ayn Rand in the development of her moral philosophy and numerous subsequent thinkers. Apologists like Mr. Apologist are only doing themselves a disservice by sheltering their evasions from the light of reason and objectivity.

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Borrowing from Theism?

Mr. Apologist wrote: “Atheism must borrow from theism the idea of an ordered universe, in which things cohere in a transcendent unifying principle.“

Again, we find the persistence of what appears to be a deliberate misunderstanding, built on a hapless disintegration of essentials, which lays onus where no onus is due. Mr. Apologist holds the absence of theism as such accountable for presumed faults, but his announcement of these accusations is delivered through a series of unargued assertions, one after another, each built on the same misunderstanding, each built on a false view of what atheism entails in terms of essentials, thus a product of religious bias, not of reason. This puts all atheists in the same boat in terms of that philosophy to which atheists do ascribe or employ, which is embarrassingly naïve. This is just another attempt to paint an individual’s rejection of theism as inherently impotent, and it fails for the same reasons we’ve seen so far.

If one’s atheism is the product of reason, there is no reason why the accusation that atheists must “borrow from theism” necessarily holds. Reason and faith are epistemological opposites, and regardless of what the theologians have said through the centuries, reason is not the “handmaid of faith.” However, in spite of these facts, Christian apologists will continue to accuse non-Christians of “borrowing” from their worldview. So let us attend to this accusation for a few moments before moving on.

To validate the claim that all non-theistic or all non-Christian philosophies must “borrow” from Christianity, the theist would have an enormous homework assignment, involving but not limited to the painstaking review of every form and variant of non-Christian philosophy in existence, as well as anticipating those non-theistic philosophies which may be discovered or refined at some future time, in order to document such dependence. Essentially, the theist would have to show that the alleged connection between atheism as such and the supposed need to “borrow” from theism is philosophically mandatory and unavoidable in all cases.

I would say that validating such an enormous claim is too big a task for theists to take so lightly, as Mr. Apologist appears to do here. And even in repeating it, he overlooks the fact that there is at least one philosophy which can be demonstrated as a complete exception to this claim. For in Objectivism we have a philosophy which dispenses entirely with any form of theism, and is therefore atheistic in nature, but which nowhere borrows from theism in general or from Christianity in particular.

A rational philosophy is not derived from a primitive and/or mystical philosophy. Nor does a rational philosophy assume supposed religious “truths” which have no objective reference to reality and which must be accepted on faith. From its basic axioms (e.g., existence exists, etc.) to its theory of concepts, from its emphasis on man’s need for an objective theory of values and for a rational defense of his individual rights, to its conception of art, Objectivism bears no philosophic, systematic or developmental resemblance to Christianity, nor does it assume in any way, shape or form the truth of Christian theism. The higher-strata positions and tenets throughout Objectivism are conclusions whose reasoning is wholly contained within its own framework, reducible exclusively to its own, entirely non-theistic, non-Christian starting points, the axioms, and the primacy of existence metaphysics. Objectivism is wholly independent of any theistic philosophy, Christian or otherwise, contrary to the thrust of such commonly encountered misrepresentations as we see here.

The Bible, Christianity’s primary source, does not identify its doctrines as stemming from core, axiomatic concepts; any such foundational ideas must be inferred from ambiguous, frequently inconsistent and exegetically flexible implications. But even then it is not the case that one doctrine follows logically from another, for Christianity ignores the objective, hierarchical nature of knowledge completely. It does not follow from the claim “God exists” that “God rested on the seventh day of creation,” or from the notion that “Adam was the first man” to the position that “Jesus is God’s only begotten Son,” any more than the claim that Jesus was “crucified and resurrected from the dead” follows from the claim that Jesus was “born of a virgin.” There is no logical consequence which gives rise to these ideas; one must simply accept these claims wholesale as a part of an enormous, maximally cumbersome package-deal of unconnected parts which are essentially supposed doctrines derived from purported ancient histories (much of which are obviously mythological in nature), and which can only be pieced together while disintegrating one’s own mind. Objectivism borrows nothing from this belligerent package-dealing. In fact, since Christianity begins with the notion of a universe-creating, reality-ruling consciousness, and thus assumes the primacy of consciousness as its fundamental principle, it cannot be said that Objectivism must assume the truth of Christianity or “borrow” from it in any sense or capacity, for Objectivism begins squarely and without exception on the basis of the primacy of existence, which is incompatible with the primacy of consciousness.

Modern Christians often claim that non-theists and/or non-theistic philosophies must “borrow” from Christianity in order to justify their assumption of the uniformity of nature. But unlike Christianity, Objectivism does not attribute the uniformity of nature to the functions of a universe-creating, reality-ruling form of consciousness (e.g., a “divine will“). Indeed, Objectivism wholly rejects the notion that reality, nature, and natural law are the product of a will or desire of a supernatural being. Objectivism rightly recognizes that existence exists, that existence exists independentof consciousness (the primacy of existence principle), and that to exist is to be something, to be itself, i.e., A is A, all points which theists themselves must assume, even though their theistic commitments wholly contradict or undermine them. There is no borrowing on the part of Objectivism from Christianity, or any form of theism for that matter, and this is precisely why some theists have been inclined to attack Objectivism, even if they refuse to take the steps necessary to comprehend it, or deliberately misrepresent its tenets. The prospect that there exists a philosophy available to all men which defies the theists’ repudiation of atheism is a threat which many cannot face head on.

Allegation of the Neglected Onus

The fallacy known as the ‘allegation of the neglected onus’ occurs when an individual charges that his opponent’s position does not sufficiently deal with an obligation that has not been shown to properly belong to the opponent’s position. It can also be called the charge of neglected incumbency. As such, it constitutes an illegitimate attempt to discredit a position by asserting a charge that such a position does not sufficiently deal with an issue that does not legitimately belong to it. Inasmuch as this fallacy entails a mischaracterization of one’s position, it resembles the straw man fallacy detailed below.

For example, a ‘creation scientist’ might assert that ‘evolutionary theories’ offer man nothing to resolve the problem of universals – the so-called ‘problem of the one and the many’ which has eluded many philosophers and schools of thought, thus implying that advocacy of ‘evolutionary theories’ amounts to the advocacy of failure in this regard. Obviously the statement to the effect that ‘evolutionary theories’ do nothing to resolve the problem of universals can be said to be true, however this does not constitute a failing on the part of evolutionary theories. The task of evolutionary theories (in biology) is of narrow scientific scope; their task is not to deal with problems of epistemology. An individual imputing evolutionary theories with this failure or negligence improperly imparts an essential epistemological task to a set of scientific theories. By its very nature as a study of specific scientific scope, evolution is not intended to offer man epistemological solutions, and to hold it to such obligations is indeed highly suspicious.

In some ways, allegation of the neglected onus resembles other common fallacies of relevance, specifically missing the point and straw man fallacies. This fallacy is akin to missing the point (ignoratio elenchi) for it often fails to take into account the fact the essential nature of a position (e.g., evolution or evolutionary theories) does not logically apply to the conclusion the arguer is trying to draw (i.e., failure of epistemological tasks). This fallacy also can resemble a straw man argument for it essentially entails a mischaracterization of the subject matter in question (e.g., evolution). Evolutionary theories are no more suited to handle epistemological issues than aerodynamic principles or geological theories.

Why is there something rather than nothing?

Mr. Apologist wrote: “The first was originally posed by Martin Heidegger: ‘Why is there something rather than nothing?’”

Mr. Apologist nowhere shows this to be valid question; instead, he simply assumes that it is valid, and expects it to have a valid answer. It will be clear to those who have a firm grasp of Objectivism, that this fellow has not thought very carefully about this subject.

For one thing, Objectivism will view such questions as “why does existence exist?” as essentially fallacious. For no matter how one will want to answer such a question, one would have to appeal, at least implicitly, to that which exists (or to what supposedly exists). Otherwise, one would put himself in the dubious position of assuming that the appeal to non-existence somehow explains existence. (The trend in philosophy since Plato, and perhaps long before him, is to posit some form of consciousness as the “answer” to such questions, even though this tactic is irrescindably incoherent.)

Thus, by posing this question and assuming that it is valid, Mr. Apologist implicitly (but unavoidably) commits himself to the fallacy of the stolen concept. If we ask why something is, but simply turn around and posit that something in our explanation of that something, what mileage have we gained? Indeed, we’re back to where we started, yet we don’t admit it to ourselves. This is what Mr. Apologist does in assuming that the question “Why is there something rather than nothing?” (or “Why does existence exist?”) is a valid question. One will have to assume the fact of existence in order to answer the question. But in so doing, he will have to deny the fact of existence in order to validate his assumption that there must be a reason why there is something rather than nothing. He must assume the very concept his argument wants to deny, thus ’stealing’ it from the objective hierarchy of knowledge, and rendering invalid any conclusion he hopes to draw from his argument.

Existence exists. We must start somewhere. The theist wants to start with a form of consciousness. He wants to posit a mind (albeit supernatural) which is responsible for creating all its objects. This is called metaphysical subjectivism, a view which holds that existence finds its source in a form of consciousness.

Some may object to my characterization of the question “Why is there something rather than nothing?” as fallacious, contesting that there is no such thing as a fallacious question. However, it is true when we examine issues in epistemology and logic, that there is a such thing as an invalid question. The fallacy known as ‘complex question‘, for instance, is a species of invalid question. It is a question which operates on a false assumption and expects the reader to accept that false assumption in order to answer it. The typical example is the question “Have you stopped beating your wife?” The question assumes that one is a married man and that he beats or has beaten his wife; indeed, it implies such beatings are a regular occurrence. Contrary to these assumptions, however, it could be the case a) that he is not married, or b) that he is married but has never beaten his wife. Since the question is asked in a manner in which a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ response can be the only appropriate reply, one cannot answer it on its own terms and avoid affirming its erroneous premises. One would implicate himself simply by answering. The question is fallacious because it leads one to accept a false premise, assuming either a) or b) are the actual case, if he should choose to take it seriously.

Likewise, a question which leads one to commit a fallacy in order to answer it is also invalid. If taken seriously, the question “Why is there something rather than nothing?” will lead one to commit the fallacy of the stolen concept; indeed, the fallacy of the stolen concept is unavoidable on the question’s own terms, as we saw above. One would have both to assume and deny existence in order to address the question. If Heidegger did not recognize this, it was principally because he was not operating on a fully rational philosophy. Yet, today we have theists assuming this question is valid all the time in the construction of their apologetic ruses. What is it that theists want to posit in response to their invalid questions so as to appear to satisfy them? Of course, they assume that the only logical answer is to assert a universe-creating, reality-ruling form of consciousness, which they call God, and delight themselves with this as their answer, never allowing themselves to recognize that the question leads them to accepting a stolen concept, and assuming that their arguments justifying this illicit move make it valid.

Mr. Apologist wrote: “And so Heidegger’s question becomes interesting. Atheism can describe the properties of what is. Objectivism can say that existence exists, but it cannot account for existence.”

As we saw above, the idea of “accounting for” existence is meaningless. Would not whatever Mr. Apologist asserts as “accounting for” existence also exist itself? If so, then he has not given an explanation (or an “account”), and if not, then he still gives us no explanation. One does not “explain” existence by appealing to non-existence, or to consciousness. Statements like Mr. Apologist’ assertion above, that “Objectivism… cannot account for existence,” only underscore the validity of the Objectivist identification that religion wants to posit a form of consciousness prior to existence.

Mr. Apologist wrote: “Any world view has to deal with questions in five areas:

1. Origin/Being (like the question above)

2. Meaning/Predication

3. Ethics/Norms

4. Destiny

5. Aesthetics”

I agree that philosophy can be divided into five principle areas or provinces, but I would not endorse the divisions which Mr. Apologist suggests entirely. Rather, I would agree with Rand that those five branches are:

1. Metaphysics: What is the nature of reality?

2. Epistemology: What is knowledge and its proper validation?

3. Morality: What is the proper code of values to guide man’s choices and actions?

4. Politics: What is the proper social theory for man?

5. Aesthetics: What is a proper theory of art?

There are a number of general differences between this list [1] and the list which Mr. Apologist provides. First, Mr. Apologist wants to position the notion “origin” as a primary concern on his list. The origin of what? Ostensibly, of being as such, since he also includes this in his first area of philosophic concern, and since he is mistaken that existence or being as such can have an explanation beyond itself, as we saw above. Here we immediately see his system’s vulnerability to stolen concepts, since the idea of an origin of being as such, i.e., of existence, is prone to denying that which must be assumed, which is the fact of existence itself. What could possibly be the origin of existence to begin with? If we posit X as the origin of existence, are we not assuming that X exists? If not, then there is no explanatory value in positing X (since non-existence does not explain existence), and if we do assume that X exists, then we’re positing what we originally set out to explain, while denying it at the same time. This will not do, for it is internally fallacious and cannot lead to rationality, which should be our goal at this point.

By asserting at the outset that a proper philosophic code must address the issue of origins to being, Mr. Apologist intentionally stacks the deck such that non-theists will automatically fail in providing a sufficient foundation to their philosophy. One cannot attempt to reason about the origin of something before one has identified the nature of that something. There is an order of priority here which theists who place such emphasis on the question of “origins” tend to overlook. If I see a car, for example, and have not made the effort to identify its make, I will have nothing to go on in determining the nation in which it was manufactured (i.e., its origin). When I investigate the matter and discover that the car is a Volvo, for instance, then I can reasonably infer that the car originally came from Sweden. No, that’s not a fantastic example, for it may be possible so far as I know that Volvo has manufacturing plants in other nations (e.g. Canada, Belgium, et al.), and the car could have been produced there. And of course this example already assumes that I’ve determined that the object I perceive is a car. Had my example not made this assumption, it is clear that the identification of the object as a car would constitute yet another step in this process. The point is that I do not need to know where the car was manufactured in order to be fully certain that the object I am perceiving is in fact an car. The question of the object’s origin is not essential to a correct identification of the fact in question. So clearly we must begin any inference of “origins” with the identification of the nature of the object in question. Otherwise, we risk committing our conclusions to a false or inaccurate context.

When it gets to the universe as a whole, which is the sum of all existence, talk of “origins” is invalid, unless one is willing to assume that non-existence as such provides valuable explanation to that which does exist. But how does non-existence explain anything, and how does non-existence qualify as an “origin” of that which does exist? Were we to assume that non-existence plays a metaphysical, explanatory role for existence, we would also have to infer that existence came about through some kind of causal activity, and thus we would risk positing the concept ‘causality’ apart from existence, and consequently commit ourselves to another stolen concept. How can one posit a cause without assuming the existence of an entity which does the causing? As David Kelley states, “there’s no dance without a dancer.” Likewise, there’s no cause without a causal agent, i.e., without something which exists. This points to the fact that we must begin with something which exists, i.e., we must begin with existence as such.

Notes

[1] This list is not my invention. This is precisely how Ayn Rand summarized her philosophy in its most general conception. See for instance The Essentials of Objectivism on the Ayn Rand Institute Homepage.

Protected: Statement Of Purpose

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Misunderstanding Scarcity

When economists say A is scarce people misunderstand that supply of A is fixed. In fact this misunderstanding lies at the core of mistrust of capitalism.

What economists mean when then say A is scarce is that, a copy of A can be of utility to only a fixed number of people.

There is a lot of difference between the two understandings. One grain of Wheat may be of utility to only a fixed people, but its supply can be increased by agriculture. e.g. Some people even grow wheat in desserts and space.

I think the only thing that is truly fixed in supply in this universe is enthalpy. But even that could change in a googol years before the heat death of this universe.

Protected: My Story

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The story from now on

Our world currently has:

1. A common commodity of exchange per nation, which is infinite in supply.
2. A common commodity of exchange of one nation (USA) being used as the common commodity of exchange between nations.

This has lead to irrational behavior among the governments and especially USA like:

• Irrational credit & spending.
• Larger governments controlled by pull & lobbyists instead of merit & reason.
• Irrational wars. (It is no coincidence that the century of World Wars coincides with rise of fiat money).
• Richer religions capable of lobbying for irrational laws.
• Morally corrupt, Clandestine operations funded by the government.

Let me try to speculate how this will turn out:

The US congress will increase its statutory limit on federal debt and continue to pay back its foreign creditors in new devalued US$. The asians, especially the Chinese and the Russians will try to own a lot of gold instead of US government bonds. This will result in hyperinflation by the US government if they wish to continue to spend for their ambitious plans. If the US government keeps becoming a regulator instead of a facilitator of human activity, a mere 50 years is all that is needed for brain drain from USA. If enough chinese communist party members are still alive 50 years from now, the Chinese will go back to their communist ways, otherwise they will remain a profit seeking economy with strict regulations, no social freedoms and high growth. Indian economic growth will become unsustainable if the government does not allow privately owned infrastructure. If the western civilization do not continue to keep their economy well running and demography secular, they will not be able to maintain social freedoms. This will automatically result in end of social freedoms across the rest of the world because the west is the only reason why people believe social freedoms are good.

The story so far, Part 2

The ancient parasites used crude techniques like physical force & violence to live on the sweat of other people’s brow. Then came religion which used more subtle techniques like fear of ostracisms and argumentum ad baculums to loot people’s money.

Just as the human means to production i.e. technology, has improved over the ages, the parasites have also improved over time in their methods to newer and more subtler means to loot human production. It was not long after the market converged on gold as the common commodity of exchange, that the powers that be of this world realized that they could loot by controlling the supply of the common commodity of exchange. But this could not be done on any real currency like gold, which was chosen by the market for it scarcity among other reasons. What was needed was an imaginary common commodity of exchange, unbound by worldly restrictions like scarcity, called the fiat money. (Scarcity here being defined as that property which makes a loaf of bread to be of utility to only a fixed number of individuals).

Fiat money could be used to pay up debt, because the governments force you to use it as legal tender. If you choose not accept that your debt was paid off with their imaginary commodity they will make you accept it with physical force. Whats more, the governments can pay for what they want with their imaginary money, because they can create as much of it as they want. But they won’t do it out of a fear of devaluation, unless they want to wage a war or get out of a depression without increasing taxes. Of course, increasing money supply can lead to higher prices without higher wages, but that is not a problem if you use price controls and vary GSTs when production becomes unsustainable under the price control.

Back when the US economy had grown wealthy from economic freedom, the economies of this world had started using the US dollar as the common currency of exchange because, back then it could be claimed in gold. But they continued to do so even after the US dollar became an imaginary commodity whose supply was controlled by the US government. This put the US government in an interesting position. It could now pay for foreign currencies by creating more of the imaginary commodity – US dollar. So people & foreign economies who lend the sweat of their brow now to the US government for earning interest are paid back in new imaginary money which isn’t worth what it used when they lend it.

Back when currencies where easily transact-able versions of gold, credit was only provided to debtors who were truly capable of paying it back with interest. The creditors asked interest in return for their deferred consumption. However the liberals in society driven by their irrational desire for fairness (this is one of the liberal pillars of morality) believed that the needy were entitled to credit regardless of whether they were capable of paying it back. Fiat money helped them realize this desire. Now the governments could increase money supply and control interest rates of the creditors.

Since political parties earn by remaining in power, and since they could remain in power by temporarily please their voters while they remain in power, all governments chose to make credit cheap by creating more fiat money.

Fortunately there are no free lunches in this universe, so this subtle scheme to loot from the producers by devaluing their currency and paying the needy through cheap credit has & will lead to depressions and recessions.

Paul Krugman scorns at this doomsday attitude, and calls it moral fatalism. But I guess you know better now: No one can mess with reality.